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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***Military Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-88-012

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24 June 1988

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**Odessa MD Scandal Surrounds Maj Gen Avn Grishin**

18010335 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 March 88 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Dokuchayev: "New Equipment, Old Approach"]

[Text] At the very height of the training in the radar company commanded by Maj V. Belozerov, one of the stations "became capricious." As it was learned, an electronics board had gone out of order. They rushed to the ZIP [kit of spare parts and accessories], but this particular board was not in it. Then, with the permission of the senior commander, they used spare parts from another RLS [radar station].

An ordinary everyday mess, but this is the whole trouble. The forces are receiving equipment in which microelectronics products are widely used: integrated microcircuits, microassemblies, micromodules. Such equipment is also being operated in the electronics unit where Lt Col A. Krasnenkov is deputy commander for armament (the company discussed above is in this unit). According to the comments of the radar operators themselves, it is good equipment with high tactical and technical specifications.

If it were only not for one circumstance.

Let us return again to the episode with this same ill-fated electronics board. I will add that the actions to be taken by the specialists to maintain the station are strictly determined by instructions: a part that has become inoperable must be sent back to the factory for repair. In general this is not difficult to do. Fill out the necessary documents and wait calmly. But here the soldiers could not wait. The station may be included among the on-alert resources.

On average each inoperable standard element is returned from the factory repaired in a month. The subordinates of Maj Belozerov, for example, waited exactly a month for the required part. But the radar station must be technically ready continuously: "We stand combat watch," Lt A. Krasnenkov shared with me. "They tell us that we have ZIP. Yes, we do, but there are not always enough spare standard elements, and at times we even have to resort to disassembling the emergency reserve of parts and equipment. And the difficulty is that ZIP are frequently packed without taking into account the recommendations of the operators, and do not always correspond to usual malfunctions. A malfunction takes place and one turns to the ZIP; however, the needed part cannot be found, and there are many of those that are practically never required."

I asked: Has anything been undertaken to speed up the return of repaired apparatuses from the factory?

"Yes," continues Lt Col A. Krasnenkov. "We wrote official letters to the factory, made requests, telephoned. It does no good. It is true that in some cases the factory personnel agreed to meet us half way, but again, that is not the effect. Let us say that in response to a complaint they express readiness to furnish the ZIP taking our desires into account. Suggestions were collected quarterly from the subunit. We thought that headway was being made. But... our suggestions were implemented only after several years. In short, written complaints, requests and telephone calls are not a promising way. Yes, and is it right that the readiness of the radar stations seemingly depends on the work of the mail, and the train schedules... I am convinced that in urgent cases it is necessary to conduct repairs using our own forces..."

We began some time ago to think about more effective operation of the equipment in the unit (and this includes repair). We thought about this already some two years ago, when Officer Yu. Nesmotryayev, was deputy unit commander for armaments. It was decided to create a section to repair microelectronics products. It turned out not to be easy to implement our idea. But, thankfully, the radio electronics troops command, Moscow PVO District, assisted. In particular, with its active support we acquired a testing and diagnostic apparatus. Without it sometimes simply curious incidents took place. We sent a board to the factory and received a dispatch from there that we had sent the wrong one. It would cost a pretty penny to send the entire unit a long way and the station would not be combat ready. With the assembly we acquired it became possible to diagnose one part or another in place. Capt R. Sabirov, a master of his military skill, and junior specialists Sgt Usmanov and PFC M. Byrnovan are doing this today independently.

Gradually the soldiers also mastered repair of the apparatus. They had to study a great deal. They studied all the literature existing in the unit on maintaining equipment on such a component base. They carried out numerous experiments. Some of the repair personnel were able to spend time at the factory that manufactured the equipment, where they became familiar with the repair technology. Recently, for example, Lt G. Nakonechnyy took such a trip.

Today the collective has acquired a certain experience in rapid repair of equipment components that have gone out of operation. Here is a specific example. A station went out of order in the company commanded by Capt A. Sergeyev. And it was necessary to conduct crucial training. The inoperable part was delivered to the shop, diagnosed and repaired. The unit began to operate that very day. Repair in the factory would have dragged out for many days. As we see, the time savings are considerable, and this is directly related to technical readiness.

"Nevertheless, difficulties still exist," stated Maj V. Slyusar, chief of the unit armament service, in conversation.



Yes, difficulties exist, and they are substantial. Spare parts are needed for repair. How are matters going in this regard? I was told that their delivery is being carried out in limited quantities. Here it is also necessary for the radar operators to do gyrations. Microcircuits are purchased at the factories, in stores, and are simply obtained through personal acquaintances. You will agree that it is even somewhat awkward to speak about the fact that the combat readiness of one or another subunit depends on the riches of the store counter. The radar operators are confronted with still greater difficulties in acquiring repair equipment and tools. They still do not have the necessary number of miniature soldering irons with solder suction, instruments, attachments, etc. The shop has only one unit for monitoring and diagnostics of apparatuses, which is insufficient. It is true that, due to the enthusiasm and efforts of many officers from the armaments service, and Capt R. Sabirov, the shop chief, the capabilities of the unit have been expanded through the creation of new distributor plates. An apparatus for monitoring and diagnostics of analog plates, built by Maj Yu. Kurlyand, is also operating effectively. The development earned a bronze medal at the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy]. But, one cannot get far on enthusiasm alone, even if it is evaluated by a medal at VDNKh. Help and assistance are needed.

As for the unit command, it is completely responsive. It allocated a special room, takes measures to acquire expendable stock, and is concerned about the professional training of the repair personnel. In short, there is some movement. However, all of this does not satisfy the specialists. It would be unfair to say that this unit was the first to talk about repairing equipment at a modern component base. The appropriate levels of PVO Voysk [Air Defense Troops], in particular, also took up this problem. But, a solution dragged out for many years.

"Literally 10 days ago we received documentation to repair weapons and military equipment at the locations where they are operating," shared Maj V. Slyusar. "Good recommendations were given for repairing the apparatus at a modern component base, but you see this is not enough. We need decisions by the appropriate officials to create lines or sections in the shops, supported by deliveries of equipment and tools. Without this the matter will not move forward significantly.

Yes, the documentation appeared late. Moreover, it was issued based on repair documents put out back in 1978. After nine years they were only able to republish it. The gap between the times of delivery of the equipment and the means of their repair will be still greater. Underevaluation of the role of the repair and technical services has had its effect. As a result, operational repair resources have turned out to be unsuitable for maintaining the equipment in constant combat readiness. The necessary apparatuses, parts and equipment were not produced. The factories simply did not react to the requests from the units.

What is the matter here? It turns out that it is not advantageous to anyone to engage in the development and production of equipment and tools. This business is not promising for the factories. Premiums and titles are not earned for this. And so it turned out that delivery of equipment to the forces has been set right, but repair...

Nevertheless, as we have seen the units are not sitting and waiting for a ship that never comes in. They are taking steps to set up the repair of new equipment using their own forces. Here is one more example. According to sketches by officers of the district radio electronics troops headquarters, mobile shops were created based on a Ural truck, that permit diagnosis of equipment and elimination of malfunctions on the spot.

"The shops passed the test in practice," stated Lt Col A. Krasnenkov. "They worked to their great credit, and officers from higher headquarters were also pleased. The district even made an inquiry of the factory about the possibility of producing a series of such shops, in order to support all units with them. And although there were substantial arguments, they were not accepted."

Why? As I was told in the unit, they were told that general purpose shops are being developed, which will support repair of practically all apparatuses existing in the forces. But, you see this is merely promises! The shops are too long in development, and it is not known when they will be received in supply. And will they be effective? In short, many questions of improving first-line repair, especially of equipment on a modern component base, remain open. And the problem is becoming worse. More and more modern equipment is arriving.

Now is the time for new approaches to improving combat readiness. And the time has come to look at the technical repair sphere not as something secondary, but as a most important matter for enhancing the combat readiness of subunits, and see beyond the usual acute problem that requires solutions.

In conclusion, here is a small mathematical problem—in the spirit of the times, economic accountability. The stipulation: What is more beneficial to acquire: 100 units of modern equipment alone, or 50 units, but with technical repair equipment? Specialists, especially practitioners, answer boldly: the second is more beneficial. The time will come, and out of a hundred stations, approximately half will work. If they are not skillfully repaired, in a timely manner. If repair is placed on a stable, modern basis, all the equipment will be continuously ready, and repair must, insofar as necessary, be brought close to the combat positions. Some experience exists in this plane. But, sadly, it has not been widely disseminated in PVO units. Today, for many people the question arises: What are they thinking about in this regard in the appropriate directorate of PVO?



**Disarmament Will Not Defuse Threat From Capitalist Aggression**

18010324 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 4,  
Feb 88 pp 45-48

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Chernyshev: "Capitalism Without Militarism?" Passages in italics and boldface as published]

[Text] *In a speech dedicated to the 70th anniversary of Great October, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, reflecting on the prospects for the formation of an all-encompassing system of international security under conditions of disarmament, poses difficult questions on which the future of civilization depends. Can capitalism adapt to the conditions of a nuclear-free and disarmed world? In the current phase of world development, at a new level of mutual dependency and the integral nature of the world, is an influence possible on imperialism that would block the most dangerous manifestations of it? Can the range of destructive action of the egocentric and narrow class features of the capitalist system be limited? Can capitalism function and develop economically without militarism?*

*It seems to me that a positive answer to these questions is hardly realistic. The nature of imperialism does not change—it was and remains aggressive and militaristic. Moreover, too many forces in the West have a vested interest in the arms race: the monopolies producing the arms, the generals, the state bureaucracy, the ideological apparatus and militarized science, all combined in the powerful military-industrial complex. Or am I incorrect?—N. Plisko (Moscow).*

Unfortunately, there are grounds for pessimistic forecasts, and many of them. In recent decades the militarization of capitalist society has increased steadily, and militarism is being turned more and more into a destructive force developing according to its own intrinsic logic and its own intrinsic laws and, moreover, dictating this logic and these laws to mankind. The military-industrial complex has acquired a certain independence in the West, and it has sometimes even come out with some success against the broader and more long-term interests of the ruling class overall.

The situation does not look insoluble nonetheless.

**One.** Notwithstanding its reactionary nature, adherence to the "policy of force," reliance on military ways of achieving military and political aims and egotistical approach to world politics, imperialism can react to changing objective circumstances. A clear example of this is the coalition between the United States, England and many other capitalist states and the Soviet Union against German fascism and Japanese militarism in World War II.

"Whereas in the past an alliance of socialist and capitalist states was possible in the face of the fascist threat," declared Comrade M.S. Gorbachev in the speech "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," "is there really any certain lesson that follows from this for the present, when the whole world has come to be faced with the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the necessity of ensuring the security of nuclear power and surmounting the ecological danger? All of these are completely real and terrible things requiring not only an awareness of them, but a search for practical solutions as well."

Another fact is the changing nature of the struggle among the imperialist powers for the economic and political division and partitioning of the world. This struggle is manifested in our time in different forms than it was at the beginning of the century: wars among the leading capitalist states are highly unlikely. The lessons of the last world war and, most important, the fear of weakening oneself before the other social system—socialism—are playing a decisive role herein. The resolution of inter-imperialist contradictions has today been transformed into harsh technological and economic competition.

An awareness is also growing in the West of the fact that capitalism had to pay a high price with major social upheavals for the world wars it unleashed. After the first, revolutionary processes were rapidly developed and the socialist revolution triumphed in Russia. World War II demonstrated even more clearly the crisis of the very institution of war as an instrument of policy. Conceived as a "crusade" against the Soviet state, this war ultimately led to the popular and worldwide historical movement against fascism and its total defeat, while in a number of countries popular-democratic revolutions were successful and the collapse of the colonial empires accelerated.

**Second.** Antagonism towards socialism doubtless remains one of the defining traits of the policies of imperialism. The fight against the new order has been conditioned first and foremost by the capitalist instinct of self-preservation. Under contemporary conditions, however, when an effort to destroy socialism militarily would inevitably entail the destruction of capitalist society, the self-preservation instinct takes on new substance.

The total force of the munitions exploded during World War II is roughly equal to 2.5 million tons of TNT. The power of the first American atomic bomb that incinerated Hiroshima was 13,000 tons. Today the power of the 50,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the countries on the planet is equivalent to 13 billion tons of TNT. This is 5,200 World War IIs and a million Hiroshimas. Scientists have calculated that just one twentieth of the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers is sufficient to inflict irreparable harm on each other. And taking into account the fires that would arise after the explosions,

less than one percent of the accumulated nuclear arms would be required for the "guaranteed annihilation" of any large major country. But this cuts both ways. Anyone who resolves to launch a first strike would doom himself to a tortuous death, and not just from an answering strike, but from the consequences of detonating one's own warheads. The spread of radiation and the impact of "nuclear winter" would completely destroy life on Earth.

Wars fought using conventional weapons are also unacceptable for certain regions. For example, in Europe, highly developed on a technological plane and with a large quantity of nuclear power plants, chemical plants, reserves of petroleum products, buried toxic wastes and the like, even a "conventional" war would be totally destructive and ruinous for every living thing.

This means that if a head-on (or even regional) clash of capitalism and socialism is fraught with catastrophe, the self-preservation instinct should operate against militarism: contemporary war is just as destructive overall for the bourgeoisie as for other classes of society, and it is just as suicidal for capitalism as for socialism. It is for that reason that many leaders of the capitalist world are beginning to realize that super-armament is not identical to security, and already a significant portion of the bourgeoisie is beginning to consider peaceful co-existence as an essential condition for the physical survival of capitalism and its historical fate.

A clash itself with the real possibility of self-destruction cannot help but foster growth in the capitalist countries in intra-political differentiation on issues of war and peace and the arms race. This relates to the ruling circles as well, where there have appeared, and probably will strengthen, realistically thinking forces and, perhaps, the proportionate share of militarist subsegments will decline in the process of devising foreign-policy solutions.

**Three.** The arms race does not meet the interests of the greater portion of the ruling class today from an economic viewpoint. It is only enriching an inconsiderable and narrow group of monopoly capital. The overwhelming majority of corporations either receive just insignificant crumbs of the military profits or remain outside the "military economy" altogether.

In the United States, for example, the Pentagon's military orders are filled by 20,000 major contractor companies and 100,000 subcontractor firms. There are roughly 14 million firms in the country overall (not including agricultural production). Consequently, less than one percent of the overall number of companies works for the Defense Department. Just a small number of gigantic specialized corporations that comprise the foundation of the military-industrial complex, however, play a leading role among them. Some 65-70 percent of the annual overall value of Pentagon orders has fallen to their share in recent decades, including about 50 percent to the largest and up to 35 percent to the first ten.

Many people have become involved in the military sphere, but not an overwhelming portion of the able-bodied population. Some 2.1 million people were working directly in military industry and one million were employed in various types of services for the military sector in the United States in 1981. Aside from this, three million Americans were in actual military service or were working under voluntary hire. The overall size of the workforce in the United States that year was 110.3 million people. This means that just 5.4 percent of the aggregate workforce of the country was "fed" directly from the militarist "fields." The overwhelming majority of the workers had no objective vested interest in the arms race.

**Four.** An ever larger portion of the ruling class of the capitalist countries is beginning to realize the negative consequences for itself of militarization—a rise in inflation and budget deficits, reductions in economic growth and the number of jobs, declines in production efficiency etc.

Take, for example, the United States. From 1946 through 1986 inclusive, its total military spending has been 3.4 trillion dollars, and moreover in the six years of the Reagan administration it has reached 1.5 trillion. First and foremost due to this factor, the rate of economic growth in the United States in the 1980s has proven to be somewhat lower (an average of 2.5 percent a year) than in the 1960s (4.3) and even in the 1970s (3.1), earlier felt to be the worst over the whole postwar period. Labor productivity—one of the most important indicators typifying the vitality of economic systems—grew an average of just 0.7 percent in 1980-84 and 0.3 in 1985-86, while, for example, this indicator was 3.2 percent in 1960-64.

The competitiveness of American industrial goods in the international market has declined sharply, and the U.S. trade deficit for 1981-86 was about 600 billion dollars. Distinctive "records" have been set by the Reagan administration in the realm of budget deficits—it jumped from 58.5 billion dollars in 1981 to 221 billion in 1987—as well as the realm of national debt, which has surpassed 2.3 trillion dollars. Whence it is clear how potentially explosive the situation is. The serious disorder of state finances and the whole credit and monetary system overall, strengthening considerably the instability of American capitalism and weakening its international economic positions, is evident.

If such economic policies continue to be brought to life, alarmed American economists warn, by the year 2000 the national debt of the United States will reach 13 trillion dollars, while interest payments on it alone will total 1.5 trillion dollars.

**Five.** History shows that a capitalist economy can develop without militarization. The minimal military spending in a number of Western states after World War

It has allowed them to achieve rapid economic development. Data on the economy of the "three centers"—the United States, Western Europe and Japan—is instructive in this regard.

At the same time as the United States has continuously expanded the arms race, diverting ever greater funding to it, the Western European states and Japan have rehabilitated their economies while simultaneously accomplishing their reconstruction. They put relatively large amounts of budget allocations at the time into financing capital investment in the civil-production sector, the creation of modern industrial capacity, raising product market competitiveness etc. All of this also predetermined their higher economic growth rates. Whereas the average annual growth rate of production was 4.5 percent in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, it reached 7 percent in West Germany and Italy and even 14 percent in Japan.

The differing levels of militarization of the economies had an effect on the rapid change in the correlation of economic forces. Whereas the United States' share of aggregate industrial production was 64.5 percent in 1948, by 1970 it had declined to 49.6 percent. The share of Western Europe grew from 34.1 to 39.3 percent over this period, and Japan's went from 1.4 to 11.1 percent.

The militarization of the economy narrows the investment base for the development of the civil sectors, and the interests of the monopolies clash first and foremost with those sectors in world markets. The withdrawal of ever greater material, financial and labor resources for military purposes cannot help but be a drag on the normal development of the economies of the capitalist states. And this is beginning to alarm a large portion of the ruling class in the United States more and more strongly.

All of the above testifies to the obvious trend of a steady narrowing of the social base of militarism and that war, the arms race and the unrestrained militarization of the economy have ceased to meet the overall class interests of the bourgeoisie. This has made it possible to pose the question of the possible reversibility of the militarization of the economy even in those capitalist countries where it has been seriously developed. The problem of converting military production into civilian is naturally not at all a simple one, but evidently a realistic solution could be found.

The overall change in world public opinion in favor of disarmament has exceedingly great significance in this process. Contemporary capitalism will not reject militarism voluntarily. Economic and political realities, the fight of broad public circles for peace and disarmament and the constructive policies of the socialist countries, however, could push it that way.

Definite shifts have been noted. An historic agreement to eliminate two classes of missiles—medium- and short-range—was concluded at the Soviet-American summit. Also attracting attention is another instance. For the first time in recent years, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, F. Carlucci, was ordered to reduce the projected fiscal 1989 military budget that had already been prepared by his predecessor, C. Weinberger, by 33 billion dollars. According to his orders, the Navy should decrease spending by almost 12 billion dollars, the Air Force by 10.5 and the Army by 9. The MX and Midgetman missile programs, new aircraft carriers and new combat helicopters are proposed for reduction or elimination. All of this is still just planning, but it is symptomatic in its own way.

Nonetheless the leading capitalist countries, including the United States, are still far from the demilitarization of their policies. The continuation of the U.S. "Star Wars" program, the results of which are proposed for utilization not only for the militarization of space and its reinforcement with space nuclear weapons, but also for the creation of fundamentally new prototypes of conventional weapons, represents a particular danger.

The leading circles of NATO, and first and foremost Great Britain and France, in no way wish to perceive the idea of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, and they are continuing to improve their own nuclear arsenals. The leadership of those countries, as well as the NATO generals, are considering plans for the nuclear "up-arming" of Western Europe after the elimination of American medium- and short-range missiles.

A communique was adopted at the December 1987 session of the NATO Council in which its participants came out in favor of an activation of collaboration between the Atlantic partners in the cause of incarnating extensive programs for the creation and deployment of more efficient types of "classical weaponry." Washington advanced a so-called "balanced technological initiative," which envisages the joint development of new types of conventional weapons by the Western countries. The U.S. administration is trying to draw both the Western European NATO countries and Japan into participating in this program.

The U.S. concept of "air-ground battle" and the NATO concept of "second-echelon strikes" (the Rogers plan) rely on the creation and utilization of new types of non-nuclear weapons with qualitatively increased destructive potential approaching the features of low-powered nuclear weapons. The Rogers plan directly assumes the surprise unleashing of combat action in concert by the ground forces, air forces and navies using all of the latest types of armed struggle at great depth for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage to enemy troops and achieving an overwhelming superiority over him along with a decisive offensive to seize his territory.



And this concept has not only not been abrogated at NATO, but is rather being materially reinforced more and more in the form of the arms and means of armed struggle that are coming in.

The old manner of thinking is nonetheless quite alive, and the most reactionary and militarist circles in the United States, Western Europe and Japan have no intention of renouncing it. There is an extremely serious struggle ahead with the opponents of disarmament and

with those who do not conceive of peace without mountains of arms or without the opportunity of obtaining profits from the arms race, who dream of dictating their will to other countries and peoples. The world is still just at the beginning of the path to demilitarization.

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**Ministry, Political Directorate Statement on Discipline**

18010100 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
30 Dec 88 p 1

[Report under the rubric "In the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy": "Selfless Military Labor, Exemplary Service and the Highest Level of Discipline Are Our Contribution to the Homeland's Defense"]

[Text] Our homeland is entering the year 1988 and a new stage in the restructuring, the stage of practical realization of the strategic course worked out at the 27th CPSU Congress and the January and July 1987 plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The Soviet people are forced to implement their creative plans and peaceful aspirations in a complex military-political situation.

"As long as the danger of war exists, as long as social revenge continues to be the pivotal point in the strategy and the militaristic programs of the West," M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his report "October and the Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," "we shall continue to do everything necessary to maintain our defensive strength at a level ruling out superiority for imperialism over socialism."

In this situation the Armed Forces bear special responsibility for the security of the homeland. The highest level of vigilance, great combat skill and effective new approaches to the improvement of the combat readiness and to the strengthening of discipline and organization are required of every fightingman in the army and navy.

Socialist competition is a powerful means of mobilizing personnel of the army and navy to successfully accomplish their assigned missions and achieve the objectives of the restructuring.

Soviet fightingmen worked vigorously and intensively to fulfill their socialist commitments during the past training year. The results for the year indicate that the course toward restructuring taken in the nation and in the Armed Forces is having a beneficial effect on the lives and activities of the military collectives and helping to stimulate their creative potential. Certain results have been achieved, and the training and indoctrinational process has been improved. The number of rated specialists, excellent and good subunits has grown. The CPSU Central Committee's demands with respect to strengthening military discipline have been persistently implemented.

It is in the interest of the homeland's security for every officer, seagoing and shore-based warrant officer, NCO and petty officer, soldier and seaman to realize in their minds and hearts that in the new training year they will

have to achieve higher goals in the combat improvement and to convert the plans and projects into practical action. Socialist competition will contribute to the achievement of these goals.

The socialist competition for the 1988 training year was initiated by personnel of missile unit "X," commanded by Lt Col N. Ulyanov, the Guards tank unit commanded by Guards Lt Col Yu. Pakhomov, the Guards air defense antiaircraft missile regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col B. Soshko, the bomber squadron commanded by Lt Col B. Maskayev and the nuclear-powered missile submarine Minskiy Komsomolets commanded by Capt 1st Rank E. Rybakov.

The patriotic undertaking of the initiators was considered and supported by the military councils and military directorates of the branches of the Armed Forces. It met with a broad response among fightingmen of the army and navy.

The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy discussed the commitments and appeals of personnel of the outstanding units and the nuclear-powered missile submarine, approved them and ordered all of the servicemen to engage actively in the socialist competition with the slogan "Selfless Military Labor, Exemplary Service and the Highest Level of Discipline Are Our Contribution to the Homeland's Defense." The military councils, commanders, political organs, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations must make the competition earnest and focused, truly competitive and militant. They must universally create conditions conducive to the demonstration of initiative and creativity. They must constantly develop in all the servicemen a desire to achieve a high level of military skill and excellent results in the combat and political training, and a sense of responsibility for the homeland's defense.

It is the priority task of commanders, political organs, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations to help every serviceman and every military collective define large and intensive but realistic socialist commitments. They need to see that the commitments accepted by the initiators of the socialist competition serve as reliable guidelines for all. The Communists and Komsomol members must be in the vanguard of the competition, as they always are. The useful initiative brought forth by the Komsomol organizations of the outstanding units to launch a socialist competition for the right to the title "70th Anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol" deserves approval.

Accomplishing the tasks assigned the Armed Forces by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Minister of Defense, completely and well, is the main objective and the main direction of the competition. We need to actively develop the spirit of rivalry and wholesome competition among the servicemen and subunits in the combat training process. We need to systematically hold

contests for best specialists, combat teams, crews, sections, platoons and companies in the performance of the exercises and the meeting of the norms, competitive reviews for exemplary maintenance of weapons and combat equipment, best training facility and best organization of invention and rationalization work, and to develop the campaign for conservation and thrift.

We must make more extensive use of the experience of outstanding units and ships for training the officer corps in ways of taking an innovative approach to the missions facing them. We need to take fuller advantage of the indoctrinational possibilities of the competition. As the right-flank participants in the restructuring, the outstanding individuals, masters and rated specialists and the personnel of excellent subunits, military units and ships must provide a real model of an aware attitude toward the fulfillment of military duty, the combat training and the acquiring of military skill, irreproachable service, strict observance of Soviet laws, the requirements contained in the military oath and regulations, military discipline, moral and ethical standards, and the solidifying of the multinational military collectives.

The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy express their firm conviction that the fightingmen of all branches of the Armed Forces will unanimously support the appeal issued by the initiators to launch a competition in the new training year for further implementing decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress and for a fitting reception for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, that they will commemorate it by achieving new levels in the combat improvement, the enhancement of vigilance and combat readiness, organization and discipline, and will provide reliable protection for the Soviet people's creative labor, for peace and socialism.

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**Army Gen Arkhipov on State of Discipline,  
'Regulation Order' in Moscow MD**  
*18010341b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*27 Apr 88 pp 1-2*

[Article by Army Gen V. Arkhipov, commander of the Moscow Military District: "Real Deeds Are Required"]

[Text] For 2 years running, there have not been any accidents in one of the regiments of the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M.I. Kalinin. It has also excelled in the high combat skills in the personnel. This is largely the result of the restructuring in the style of activities of the commander, the staff and the party organization. In particular, there has been more exactingness, professionalism and focusing on the solving of concrete problems.

The system in the work of maintaining a proper level of discipline and prescribed order here has developed out of numerous components. The basis of this is ensuring the personal example of the officers, including in the moral sphere, the strengthening of exactingness and the personal demands on each official for a personal contribution to strengthening organization and the carrying out of prescribed duties. This also includes precise regulation: who should do what and when, who is to monitor the execution at each area of everything involved, for instance, with the organization of troop service, the everyday life of the personnel and so forth. The unit party bureau headed by Guards Maj K. Avtukh works to strengthen discipline primarily by increasing the responsibility of the communist officers for this.

To put it figuratively, the experience of this regiment is one of our strongpoints in the work to deepen the restructuring of policy which was outlined 3 years ago at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In one of his speeches the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, emphasized that these would be years of hard work involving the search for the new and the shattering of many established ideas. Each of us feels this.

The restructuring has touched upon all spheres of life of the troop collectives and all aspects of the activities of the military personnel. One of its main directions has been the work of strengthening organization and regulation order. Here the restructuring for us is inseparably linked to the carrying out of the task set by the party of fundamentally improving military discipline in the Army and Navy.

The district has other units as well as formations and military schools where the last period was marked by a noticeable improvement in discipline. In these are the Kantemirovka Guards Tank Division imeni Yu.V. Andropov, the Tula Higher Artillery Engineer School imeni The Tula Proletariat and the unit which until recently was under the command of Col M. Belov and received the challenge Red Banner of the Ground Troops Military Council. Here the basis of success has been a systematic and comprehensive approach, a unity of organizational and upbringing work, and a concentrating of efforts on strengthening the profound bases of military discipline, that is, awareness and conviction among the personnel. The task of strengthening discipline is carried out by improving military training, by increasing its upbringing role, ensuring strict prescribed order and improving the everyday life of the personnel.

I began with good reason with the state of affairs in this regiment. The regimental and ship element is decisive in carrying out all the tasks, including those for a fundamental improvement in discipline. Where the commander, the staff, the political workers and the party organization are focused on specific deeds and where the work is carried out on a daily and purposeful basis, success is unfailingly achieved.



Naturally, the leading role is played by the regimental commander as a one-man-commander who bears full responsibility for the state of affairs in the unit. Many examples are known where with the arrival of a new more energetic and responsible commander, the previously lagging regiment began literally to change before your eyes. Quite understandably we view the development of the regimental commanders, including their arming with the art of maintaining strong discipline as the most important element in all the work of resolving the set tasks. More attention has begun to be paid to these questions in the process of individual work with the regimental commanders and at meetings with them.

The regiment's party organization is working directly in our main, if it can be so said, type of production, that is, producing combat readiness and discipline. The effectiveness of this work's influence on raising organization and teamwork of the troop collectives to a decisive degree is determined, as the experience of the leading units shows, by the ability to give a political resonance to the given questions and constantly maintain the proper level of mobilization and responsibility of the communists.

Precisely such an approach when the emphasis is put on increasing the responsibility of each communist for carrying out party and official duty and on increasing his personal contribution to the strengthening of discipline determines, for example, the effectiveness of the work done by the party committee of which Lt Col Yu. Lopunov is a member. At the sessions of the party committee and the bureau, they analyze the activities of the communists to carry out the requirements of restructuring. Here in the forefront are the questions of discipline and organization. They were also at the center of attention in discussing the reports of the party committee and party bureau of the subunits on the leadership of the restructuring in the troop collectives. Other forms of work are also used. For instance, periodic colloquiums of the party committee members with the communists on the questions of their personal contribution to the strengthening of order.

What am I doing personally to carry out the requirements of the party Central Committee on fundamentally improving discipline? We feel that presently one of the main tasks of the party committees consists in creating an atmosphere in a unit or subunit which would impel each communist in a strict and principled manner to raise this question for himself. It should be a question of mastering the political forms of influence on carrying out the questions of improving discipline as, certainly, in all else.

Unfortunately, many have still not sufficiently mastered this ability. In some places, having achieved a certain result such as a reduction in the number of violations by a "head-on attack," that is, by the forced employment of administrative and pressure methods, they have felt that they have set out on the right course. But life has shown

that "tightening up" and an increase in the number of sessions and meetings of the aktiv and conferences where they examine disciplinary questions, if capable of producing any effect it is only temporary. After a certain upsurge there inevitably follows a decline, and at times a very significant one.

This is what happened, for example, in regiment X. Here there were definite shifts in the initial stage. Later, when the wave of measures had gone into decline, violations became more frequent. The main reason was that the leader communists Officers P. Imshinov and A. Zlobin gave way to a mood of indifference and considered that a certain percentage of decline in infractions over a certain interval of time already would serve as a shield behind which one could hide from criticism. There were numerous sessions and a number of useful decisions and recommendations was adopted. But these were not followed up by hard work to implement them and the correct words were not reinforced by deeds, by exactingness, by a precise organization of service in all areas or by greater responsibility of each for the assigned job.

A thorough analysis of the state of affairs in the given unit brought to light shortcomings characteristic also for a number of other units. To what did these come down? Certain officials and party organizations lacked principle in assessing the sources of various infractions as well as a lack of professionalism and purposefulness in practical work. Having commenced the work of fundamentally improving discipline, they "bogged down" in the period of agitation and explanations. And what happened was there were numerous appeals but, for example, no one was effectively concerned with the training of the guard. Certainly the most important thing is the organizing of the question.

There was an analogous situation in individual subunits of formation X. For example, there were numerous various measures where they examined the questions of bringing the officers closer to the men, strengthening individual work and these were listed in his speech at a party aktiv meeting by Maj A. Samokhval. But what happened in fact? In one battery for a rather extended time there had been incorrect relations between the servicemen and this was a "surprise" for the regiment's command. What was, one might ask, the real value of the numerous conversations conducted in this unit on restructuring, on the need to focus efforts on the work directly in the company and strengthen the political influence on each serviceman.

The efforts of the district directorates and services have been focused on improving the political indoctrination directly in the units and subunits. Naturally, it would be incorrect to imagine the officers of the superior staffs in the role of some "interlopers" in the company who take over for the subunit commanders and the political workers. Certainly, periodically, they must work in the company, pursuing here the aim of a thorough study of a certain question and ascertaining general trends. But

their main task is to bring about an improvement in matters by training the leadership of the units and introducing advanced experience.

The demand to evaluate the personal contribution of each man to strengthening discipline extends also to the district headquarters personnel, including to the military council members. Such an assessment is given periodically to the military council members at its sessions. The question is posed as follows: one must commence with oneself, that is, set an example of personal discipline and purposefulness in the work of instilling order, in steadfastly moving from inspector functions to the organizing of work. Such an approach is characteristic, in particular, of Cols A. Nagornyy and N. Buday. Naturally where they work the level of organization grows.

At the same time one cannot help but recognize that the old ineffective approaches still prevail in the activities of a large portion of the officials. What is the main drawback of this? In the fact that certain leaders uncritically assess the state of affairs and do not show proper tenacity in maintaining firm prescribed order. In individual district headquarters and staffs of the formations, the work is carried out chiefly "for oneself," and intense "activities" are initiated in the form of holding various conferences and sessions in the personnel itself while the vital organization of things directly in the units and subunits remains secondary. There still is an infatuation with general measures, ineffective inspections and the issuing of numerous orders which frequently are not backed up by concrete organizational work.

Such shortcomings are characteristic, for example, of Maj Gen B. Krupenin and a number of his subordinates. In their work plans in the area of strengthening discipline there is a predominance of a rush to address everything to the inferior elements: there they should do thus and so. But what the officers of the superior level themselves should do, what should be the personal contribution of each and who organizes what in the subordinate subunits—here you will not find a precise answer. For this reason the effectiveness of their work is still low and because of this the necessary measures are being undertaken. We see our task of having all the elements of the command apparatus face the questions of discipline and the instituting of prescribed order.

I would particularly like to take up the question of exactingness in assessing what has been done. Let me start with a document which takes up the state of affairs in unit X according to the results of the first quarter of the current year. One cannot help but recognize that a good deal of inventiveness has been shown by Officer Yu. Vasyutin who signed this document in order to show things in a better light. Attention, for example, was focused on one of the indicators characterizing the state of discipline, that is, in comparison with last year a certain improvement was achieved. In other instances they did not turn to a comparison if it looked bad. As a whole one could feel a desire to show that there had been

a change and soon one could expect a fundamental turning point. Of course, any positive results must be pointed out and primarily to encourage energetic work. But, let us stress, real results and not the appearance of an improvement which some try to create by juggling the figures. For us, military people, duty commands us to assess any phenomena from the standpoint of combat. And in a war, as is known, intoxication with minor successes and the embellishing of actuality inevitably lead to losses and to blood. It is essential to be able to look truth in the eyes and one must always remember the lesson of truth. A half truth which shamefacedly skirts sharp corners impedes things and prevents advance. This is the source of our implacable attitude toward the parade tone of certain stories, to the attempts to depict particular achievements in one or another area as the start of fundamental changes and to the still frequently appearing inertia of indifference and complacency.

Empty campaigning is a serious impediment in the work of fundamentally improving discipline. Hurry and rush work unacceptable in any matter are particularly harmful here. Recently, for example, there has been a certain abatement in the fight against drunkenness. Certain troop collectives restricted themselves to banning measures, they were complacent and did not initiate work in other areas. This, of course, must not be tolerated.

There is a seeming incompatibility of the concepts of closeness to others and a campaign rush. But here its influence at times is very tangible. At one time a good deal was said about closeness to others by Officer V. Muzychenko and his immediate assistants. But this was largely a sort of "tribute to fashion" and the result of responding to instructions "from above." But in the unit there was no true closeness or a profound knowledge of the state of affairs in each troop collective and their moods. This became apparent in an analysis in an infraction in one of the companies. Certain soldiers knew that this was "maturing" but they remained silent, in being guided by a false understanding of a feeling of comradeship. The subunit's officers and the senior chiefs were not in control of the situation and for them the infraction was a "bolt out of the blue." They even endeavored to justify themselves by saying that they did not know and were not informed. At the same time, ignorance of the true state of affairs is not a mitigating but rather aggravating circumstance.

I feel that in developing in officers a need for closeness to the soldiers based upon class unity we do not make sufficient use of frontline experience. We might remember how many remarkable, truly touching examples of frontline fraternity exist in the works of artistic literature. For example, I am fond of rereading "Vasilii Terkin." Recently I again leafed through "Kniga pro boytsa" [A Book About a Soldier]. In it there is the following episode. Terkin who had downed an enemy

aircraft with his rifle was receiving an award from the division's commander. And after this:

They embraced, the men,

The major general with the soldier,

The general with his favorite son,

And the soldier with his own father.

With what delicacy and stirring simplicity the author has rendered here the closeness of the commander and the soldier and the unity of the souls of the Soviet people to whom the motherland in that terrible hour entrusted its fate, having set for each the place in the battle formation. The same principles of duty, honor and unity presently determine the line of conduct for each of us.

Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of our work in strengthening discipline grows if we will turn more frequently to such examples, if such expressive episodes of the war-time years will be heard at the officer meetings and in the exercises in the Marxist-Leninist training system, and if this problem will be viewed in a principled manner.

In principle, we feel, there is the valid conclusion: insufficiently high effectiveness in strengthening discipline in certain units to a significant degree is explained by its lagging behind the level of today's requirements. Often this work is carried out without considering the current general educational level of the men, the multinational nature of the personnel, by rote and for the sake of notorious "points." In some places many measures are carried out but the return is almost zero. Because they endeavor to resolve the question using the old approaches, relying on the "gross," and not truly being concerned with the content and emotional effect on the men.

There are, of course, examples worthy of emulation. For example, with an appropriate level of preparation, evenings celebrating officers and NCOs with the participation of their family members, question and answer meetings conducted on the unit or subunit scale and morning meetings in the company Lenin rooms "Tell About Yourself, Comrade!" have proven effective. The latter are timed, as a rule, to the arrival of new recruits in the company and are designed to unite the multinational troop collectives.

In the Lenin room of a company I recently noticed an album entitled "Write Letters to Mothers!" In it were letters from the parents of the soldiers sent upon the request of the Komsomol bureau. The letters contain biddings to the sons, stories about relatives who participated in the Great Patriotic War and about their labor accomplishments as well as requests to the soldiers. It was not without emotion that I read these human documents. I assume that for the men of the subunit, familiarity with them and their periodic reading does leave a

mark. I feel that the political worker, Guards Maj V. Tarakanov and other communists in the unit who were responsible for keeping these albums are following the correct path.

I would also like to mention the albums which the men keep before being discharged into the reserves. As is known, in some places their content was very far from the desired. Prohibitive measures did not always bring the required result. But must we fight against these albums and isn't it better to be concerned that their "filling out" had a positive effect? Such a posing of the question has proven effective. For example, in unit X, with the active involvement of the Komsomol committee which is headed by Lt V. Bogomolov, long before the issuing of the order for the next discharge, they organized photographing for the albums of the men who were to say farewell to the unit, the selecting of verses and other materials. Such albums are now not hidden in suitcases but are shown to comrades with pride.

We directly link greater effectiveness in the strengthening of discipline to a further deepening of the process of democratizing army life and to an intensifying of the human factor. It is a question primarily of increasing the effective activities of the elected party and Komsomol bodies, the greatest possible development of initiative and responsibility of the men with the aid of the officer meetings, the personnel meetings, the certification commissions and other public bodies.

On the agenda is the question of the more active use of military rituals and all that is fine in military service. The general regimental evening inspection, the taking of the military oath, singing while walking through a city and the presenting of weapons—how all of this elevates a man. But do we always utilize these opportunities? Unfortunately, certain commanders and political workers show no concern to use these and other forms of work to show to a soldier the beauty and romance of military service and its high calling. We feel that a restructuring in this area precisely presupposes the more effective use of those forms and methods which to a maximum degree help to activate the human factor.

Two months remain until the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Preparation for it presupposes a thorough, critical analysis of what has been done. We do not have the right to forget for a minute that we are confronted with the task of bringing about a fundamental improvement in discipline. Here we cannot get by with "cosmetic" measures or minor adjustments in style. There must be tenacious, energetic and purposeful work.



**Lt Gen Generalov Summarizes Winter Combat Training Period**

18010340a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 May 88 1st Edition p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen L. Generalov, first deputy commander of the Carpathian Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Col V. Bogdanovskiy: "The Main Thing Is Real Skills; Combat Training: Strictness of Criteria"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] Winter combat training is drawing to a close. During these days one can particularly feel the intensity of the competition to properly greet the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The summing up of the training results is still to come. But at present, when inspection exercises are underway in the troops, it is already possible to judge both the effectiveness of the military service as well as the reasons for the existing oversights. At the request of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Col V. Bogdanovskiy, the 1st Deputy Commander of the Carpathian Military District, Lt Gen L. Generalov, shared his thoughts on this issue. [End of Editorial Introduction]

[Question] Comrade Lieutenant General, what indications of the new in combat training which have appeared in the winter training period could be mentioned now?

[Answer] It is noteworthy, probably, that in the daily work of the commanders, staffs and political bodies there has come to be greater concreteness and a focusing on a high end result. In particular, this is apparent in the fact that they are working more tenaciously so that the military and political training plans and exercise schedules become a law in the life of the units and subunits. They are carrying out more energetically than before the principle of "teaching the troops what is required in a war."

For example, I have repeatedly happened to see, as they say, at work the subunits of the regiment which until recently was under the command of Col N. Zelenov. Particularly memorable were Maj M. Usoltsev and Capt L. Proklov. The officers quickly and intelligently assessed the situation, they took sound decisions and showed tactical boldness and creativity. I feel that this is the direct result of the active and purposeful work done with them in the commander training system.

I was also pleased by the weapons training exercises in the tank company under the command of Capt A. Mamonov. It stood out from those which I had seen previously, primarily in the content of the exercise. The fire tasks were carried out against a more complicated tactical background. One cannot but help as well the stricter criteria which the company commander followed in determining the winners in the competition. In one of the shifts, for example, all the gunners in terms of the number of hits could claim a high grade. However, only

one was given this. For the remainder Capt Mamonov noted shortcomings which he previously, possibly, had not noted such as errors in establishing contact and being late with the first round....

Here it was not a question of the captiousness of the company commander, as some might be inclined to assess his strictness. The officer had endeavored to teach the men [as if] for [real] battle. For him the main thing was not the grade, but rather the readiness of subordinates for operations under difficult conditions. It was merely a pity that not everyone understood this. Incidentally, here sooner than elsewhere they are inclined to thinking in stereotypes with the habit of assessing the work of an officer not by the real skills of his subordinates but rather in points and numbers. In this context I cannot help but agree with the author of the article "Obsolete Paragraph" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 March), Capt 1st Rank M. Motsak, who argues against those who judge the fighting qualities of commanders and crews solely by grades. Such an approach also exists in the Ground Troops. Here there is something for all of us to reflect on. And actually, as the author of the article "Obsolete Paragraph" writes, it is better now, in combat training, to make everything not go smoothly but rather to gain new experience, that very experience which will bring victory tomorrow.

I would particularly like to add to what I have said that such an approach should also exist in evaluating commander training. Constant mobilization and a readiness for action—this is the normal state of an officer. I feel that the man who has served as part of the limited Soviet troop contingent in Afghanistan knows what this is.

[Question] Unfortunately, in many exercises one still encounters instances of oversimplification and weaknesses....

[Answer] In actuality, there are numerous such instances. And we are particularly concerned by the deafness of certain leaders to criticism and the desire to protect themselves from this by a verbal shield. Here is an example. Last year, at a final exercise, Lt Col A. Duma and Capt V. Pilka and N. Sholom demonstrated very poor skills. Seemingly the regiment would draw serious conclusions from this and would take measures. In actuality, there were numerous discussions of this. However, with the start of winter training they again forgot about the artillery troops which had caused the regiment to receive a reduced grade. Where was the skill to come from?

In the course of inspection exercises, many other shortcomings also turned up. For instance, in tactical exercises they do not always designate an "enemy" and simulation devices are not employed wisely everywhere. Of course, under such conditions one must not count on enterprising, intelligent actions by a soldier or officer. Here, obviously, we the senior officers are falling short. We must reorganize the style and methods of directing

combat training, we must analyze more profoundly the processes and phenomena occurring, bring out the reasons for the existing shortcomings and take more effective measures to eradicate them. We recently had a serious discussion of this at a session of the district military council. It had to be admitted that we had overlooked a great deal, we had become accustomed to much and at times we simply made a deal with our conscience, showing softness where, as they say, there should be power.

At this same military council session, for example, the name of Lt Col A. Debilyy was mentioned. He leads one of our training centers. More accurately, he was obliged to lead. However, the officer was not really concerned with the work and abused alcohol. Can one think that this was a secret for the officers of the divisional or district command element? No. Nevertheless, measures were not taken. As a result, the tank moving target firing range, the training building and the soldiers' mess became unusable. And isn't the blame with the command personnel in that recently another chief of a training center Col B. Belous has also begun to slacken off in his work?

[Question] In a word, during the time remaining until the inspection we must not only increase our efforts in achieving what has been set for the competition but also do a great deal to make up for what has been overlooked? But what is most disconcerting of all?

[Answer] The indifference. The shuffling, if it can be so put, of the plans. Let us take the above-mentioned tank regiment. Here far from all of the field exercises were carried out with the proper effect. Why? The divisional staff knew that the regiment's subunits were preparing for a field exercise but at the very same time it decided to conduct an assembly for the battalion commanders. And what happened? Capt A. Kovalev and Sr Lts I. Aleksandrenko and S. Chalyy had just been appointed company commanders. Clearly the officers needed help. But nearby there was not only no battalion commander but also no chief of staff or deputy battalion commanders for political affairs and weaponry.

Certainly, assemblies must be conducted for the battalion commanders. But these must be planned reasonably so that this does not tell on the training process.

The quality of combat training and the success of restructuring in this priority of our work are determined by the concrete contribution of each serviceman. And generally we have units and subunits where this contribution is rather high and this makes a marked contribution to carrying out urgent tasks related to improving the training process and strengthening discipline and order. As an example one might mention the motorized rifle regiment X. Initially, in truth, not everything was going well here. In the middle of the winter training period, the regiment's staff discovered flaws in personnel training. In a number of companies this had been allowed to drift

and was carried out without a specific plan. At the same time things were going well in the battalion under the command of Maj S. Yershov (recently he was promoted). The regimental commander and the party organization took effective measures to disseminate the experience of this battalion. Maj Yershov spoke to the officers. The best platoon and squad commanders, the grenade launcher troops, the machine gunner and riflemen demonstrated to all the personnel rational ways for surpassing the standard times and proven methods of employing the weapons and equipment. In the regiment concern was taken to raise the role of the sergeants in the training and indoctrination of subordinates. At present after 1900 hours you will not see the officers of the battalion and company level in the area. This has provided an opportunity for the company and platoon commanders to work more on improving their military technical training, educational skills and class skills. The effectiveness of the work done in the regiment can be seen from the results of the recently held tactical exercises. The motorized rifle troops demonstrated high teamwork as well as increased tactical and weapons skills.

[Question] How is such experience being introduced in the other district subunits and units?

[Answer] I must say that for now it is making headway slowly. For this reason not all of our subunits and units can boast of successes in the competition. Here the problem often is that some commanders, staffs and political workers work in the old manner and do not fully utilize their available opportunities for studying and generalizing experience and passing it on to those who lag behind. The competition is still poorly utilized for these purposes. Everyone knows how much it can provide the men on the level of generalizing experience, when it actually becomes an inseparable part of the training process. But the misfortune is that proper attention is far from always given to the organizing of the competition. The results are summed up haphazardly. In working recently in one of the regiments, I was interested in who had set what goals for the winter training period and who was competing with whom. In many instances, I did not obtain an intelligent reply.

The absence of precise organizational work aimed at ensuring competitiveness in the exercises also tells on the state of affairs with class ratings. A class qualification, as is known, is one of the most important indicators of the professional skill of any rank serviceman. But it does happen that in some places it loses its prestige. Certain officers go for years with a third class. And there are those who do not even know what button to press to fire a round from a tank. Many officers are unable, for instance, Capt A. Sadriyev, Sr Lt A. Kiselev and Lt N. Sklyannyy, to zero a gun. Obviously, in summing up the results of the winter training period, such persons must be asked: isn't this shameful for you, dear comrades?

[Question] Is it worth waiting to sum up the results? It might be wise, for instance, to question the officers about their class rating now, and this might give them an impetus to intensify this work?

[Answer] Here you, of course, are right. I certainly do not have in mind that we should let things drift until the inspection and will not question the officers on how they are developing in professional terms. The question should be a daily one. We are striving so that each man would conscientiously carry out his job. And this includes the leaders. I have mentioned Capt Sadriyev, Sr Lt Kiselev and Lt Sklyannyy who do not have the ability to zero a gun. And where does this ability come from if now in some places we still organize teams of the best trained specialists to zero a gun. They do carry this out. But the commanders remain on the sidelines.

To put it briefly, there is much to do ahead. We must work hard in order to greet the 19th All-Union Party Conference with a further rise in combat readiness and a strengthening of organization and discipline.

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#### **Chief of Military Topography on Directorate's Functions**

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 May 88 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Col Gen B. Bizov, Chief of the Military Topography Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col R. Makushin: "These Difficult Roads;" date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] By Order of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs No. 339 of 8 May 1918, the All-Russian High Staff was organized and this included the Military Topography Directorate (VTU) which headed the Military Topographers Corps. At present, this is the Topographic Service of the USSR Armed Forces.

On the eve of its jubilee, our correspondent Col R. Makushin met with the chief of the Military Topography Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Col Gen B. Bizov.

[Question] Boris Yefimovich [Bizov], at present it would be difficult to imagine a military man without a map. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze at one time said: "Without a map, without a knowledge of the terrain it is impossible to direct combat." What is the degree of involvement of the topographic service in providing the troops with maps, these what is possibly obvious to say, commander weapons?

[Answer] Probably the phrase "degree of involvement" is not completely accurate. The problem is that the task of our service is topographic support for troop combat (in peacetime, combat readiness). We should ahead of time prepare and issue to the troops all of the topographic data essential for them, including first and foremost, the topographic maps. And this means that any map which is in the troops presently is something we

have done. In the direct sense. For we do everything starting from the initial surveying of the terrain up to the making of the map in the form that you are holding it in your hands. For this the service possesses the necessary units and skilled specialists in many areas. But this is not all. In order that a map plays its role, it is essential to know how to use it intelligently. Important is good topographic training of the personnel and above all the officers. The organization and execution of this is also a concern of ours.

[Question] Boris Yefimovich, the topographic service is celebrating its 70th anniversary. How did it start?

[Answer] You certainly know what the Civil War was like. And where there is a war without fail there must also be maps for all levels of command, including for the highest bodies in the state. During the years of the Civil War, V.I. Lenin personally provided leadership over the armed struggle of the Soviet nation.

We, the military topographers, are proud of the fact that Vladimir Ilich had high regard for our labor and widely employed the maps created by the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Military Topographers Corps. Among the books and journals presently kept in the Kremlin office of V.I. Lenin are 99 geographic and topographic maps and atlases of varying content.

One of the first tasks which confronted the RKKA Military Topographers Corps was to conduct topographic surveys on a two-verst scale on the distant approaches to Moscow and to Petrograd as well as route surveying on the same scale along the Murmansk Railroad. During those years there were numerous difficulties but nevertheless the troops of the operational army received the required maps and this, without any doubt, helped in more successfully carrying out many operations to defeat the interventionists and the White Guards. I might give the following figure: over the years of the Civil War the troops received around 61 million copies of maps. That was a good deal.

[Question] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, this figure certainly was even greater?

[Answer] Yes, of course. But this was achieved by great effort. During the years of peacetime construction, to a large degree the facilities of our topographic enterprises were largely replaced and we began receiving new instruments and equipment. This made it possible, in particular, in the mid-1930s to create new examples of topographic maps with a coordinate grid, training topographic maps as well as special maps such as flight and air navigation. By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the units, facilities and staff organizations of the VTS [Military Topography Service] were manned with skilled personnel and equipped with topogeodetic and cartographic equipment. All the same by the start of the war there were not enough mobile map publishing and



photogrammetric facilities. It had not been possible to carry out all the planned measures to accelerate the technical reequipping of the VTS.

The main misfortune was in the miscalculations in promptly creating large-scale maps for the central regions of the European USSR directly adjacent to the border areas. These shortcomings had to be rectified in the course of the fighting by enormous effort. As a whole during the war years, the Topographic Service honorably carried out its tasks. Some 28 VTS units became order-bearing while over 5,000 military geodesists, topographers, cartographers, workers and employees of the VTS received orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

[Question] What would you say about the present topographic service?

[Answer] During the postwar years, we have carried out many major tasks in improving the topographic maps as well as developing new special ones. Yet the level of the scientific and technical development of the topographic service still has not met the urgent requirements of the Armed Forces.

At the beginning of the 1980s, a qualitatively new stage commenced in the development of our service. As a result of the adopting of comprehensive measures by industry together with the USSR Academy of Sciences with the active involvement of scientists and specialists from our service, in a short period of time fundamentally new sets of equipment and technologies have been developed and these have no domestic analogues. At the same time, in the units a new physical base is being developed for them. Due to the industriousness and tenacity of our people, equipment and technology are rapidly being mastered by the personnel of the topographic units. For successes in carrying out the set tasks many officers and engineer-technical workers have been awarded orders and medals of the USSR while one of the pacesetter collectives has been awarded the Order of the Labor Red Banner.

It would be possible to name scores of persons who presently set the example for others and are always out front. These are Cols V. Yevsyukov, N. Petrov and G. Shapovalov, Maj V. Drochan, Capt V. Sudarenkov, the Soviet Army employee and lathe operator, V. Krylov, the optical mechanic, V. Ogurtsov, and the printer, Yu. Shibayev.

[Question] One other question. Is the topographic service involved in carrying out national economic tasks?

[Answer] Most directly. This, I would say, is a tradition of ours. Here is an example. At one time the military topographers and geodesists carried out work on the territory of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly and on the floodplain of the Dnieper for designing and building

Dneproges [Dnieper Hydropower System], they participated in the Pamir expeditions of the USSR Academy of Sciences and conducted topographic surveys in the deserts of Central Asia.

Over the 70 years of research on the enormous expanses of our motherland, the topographers have discovered and plotted on maps hundreds of previously unknown geographic objects. In carrying out the assignments of the motherland, the topographers have been among the first to reach the ice-covered mountain peaks, to blaze trails in the virgin tayga, to cross rushing mountain streams, and surmount impassable swamps and bogs and the scorching desert sands.

Yet we have given and do give chief attention to the training and indoctrinating of highly skilled personnel capable of carrying out the set tasks under difficult conditions.

At present, the personnel of the topographic service live for restructuring and which is manifested in a stronger party influence on all aspects of the life of the troop units and labor collectives of the service, in the struggle for improved quality and effectiveness of the special work and the greatest possible strengthening of military and labor discipline.

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#### **Turkestan MD Commander on Improving Quality of Regimental Officers**

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[Article by Col Gen N. Popov, commander, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Combat Training: Reserves of Acceleration"]

[Text] The combat readiness of units and subunits is directly dependent on the degree of training of their personnel and the level of their military skill. This is understandable. No matter how modern weapons may be, in and of themselves they do not guarantee victory in combat. Man has been and remains the main, decisive force. Success on the field of battle will be determined by his ability to use weapons and equipment effectively under various conditions, including the most difficult. That is why for us military people Lenin's demand has been and will always be urgent: "Prepare seriously, intensely and unswervingly for the defense of the fatherland, the defense of the Socialist Soviet Republic!"

The military council, political directorate and district headquarters pay particular attention to improving the quality of combat training. We are glad that positive developments have been noted here. In a number of large units and units positive changes in the organization of the training and indoctrination process have become visible, and the professional skill of the soldiers is

growing more and more appreciable. In large part this stems from the fact that organizational qualities are being manifested more vividly today in the activity of military cadres, especially the qualities of efficiency and the ability to awaken people's energy and rely on the masses. It is also encouraging that complacency and smugness, and attempts by a number of communist leaders to cover up their own omissions by making reference to objective circumstances or the poor work of subordinates have been reduced.

This is especially noticeable in the regiments, the main elements of the troop organism, in which many of the most important party decisions, and requirements of the USSR minister of defense and the district military council are implemented in practice. The main responsibility for high end results in combat and political training, and strengthening discipline rests with the unit commands and party committees. It is the regiments today where the center of organizational and educational work to implement restructuring is located. Here of late they have been able to increase people's activeness significantly and to direct their efforts towards solving the key combat training tasks.

What made this possible? It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. In order to raise combat training to the required level a system is necessary that is based on the requirements of life and scientifically based recommendations, and which encompasses many aspects of the activity of leadership cadres. At the same time, this system must include that without which the achievement of high results in the training and education of the soldiers is unthinkable. This is a responsible attitude on the part of each, i emphasize each, leader toward improving the quality of the training and education process, and achieving the highest skill on the part of his subordinates. And undoubted successes are obvious where a situation has been created in which all officers and communists make their maximum contributions to improving the level of training of their subordinates.

The artillery regiment where Lt Col A. Kapranov is serving was among the best in the district according to the results of the training year. Of course, this is most of all to the credit of the commander. A man of high military caliber and an outstanding specialist, he organizes the training process knowledgeably, and established effective control over the course of combat training. A precise rhythm of training classes is being maintained in the unit, and a stop is resolutely being put to deviations from the daily routine. But, there is also no doubt that, without reliance on his deputies, and the headquarters and party organization, the unit commander would not have succeeded in setting up the personnel training systematically, without slumps and breaks, in such a short period of time. In many ways it is precisely through the efforts of officers in the headquarters, party committee and subunit party organizations

that a moral atmosphere has been created in the regiment that stimulates the creative activeness of the communists, is conducive to the principled assessment of shortcomings, and aims everyone toward full output.

It is a characteristic fact that, while previously a battery or artillery battalion commander, suppose, who prepared poorly for classes or was guilty of taking people away from combat training, could count on the fact that no measures of party influence would be taken against him, today there are no grounds for such hopes. Every instance of a slipshod attitude toward one's duties by one or another communist leader is invariably made known, and becomes a subject of discussion at a party committee or party bureau session, or a party meeting. I see such demandingness on the part of the party organizations as one of the main components of the successes that the regiment has achieved today.

Unfortunately, this style of work has not yet become characteristic of all communist leaders and party organizations. Thus, the single-mindedness of purpose toward the command and party committee of the tank regiment in which Lt Col B. Plugin serves is clearly insufficient. Both the commander and the activists should display greater insistence and purposefulness in ensuring the effectiveness of the training process, achieving the leading role of communists in training and the broad development of competition, and supporting the patriotic movement for soldiers' acceleration, which was born in this unit. Today it is necessary to strengthen at all levels party influence on solving the tasks of improving the combat readiness of collectives, placing party demands on the organization and status of the process of training and educating the soldiers, and achieving its high end results. Shortcomings in this matter show that the inhibiting mechanism in combat training has not yet been broken for once and for all. And we must more boldly and effectively extract lessons from the past.

One of those lessons is that it is necessary to increase constantly the responsibility of cadres for the work entrusted to them, and to create an environment of mutual demandingness. It is impermissible for people to remain in leadership positions who do not cope with their duties. The sole commander bears personal responsibility for the continuous combat and political training of the collective entrusted to him, and for the military discipline and political-moral state of the personnel. He is obligated, and this requirement is affixed in the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulation, to implement firmly and consistently the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet state; to study and introduce in practice everything that is new and advanced, that helps improve the effectiveness of the training and education of his subordinates; and to be for them an example of strict observance of the norms of communist morality, irreproachable fulfillment of the requirements of Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations and his official duties.

In short, the communist leader must correspond to the requirements of the times. Today as well the words of M. I. Kalinin have not lost their topicality. Speaking about confirming the reputation of a capable commander-educator, he emphasized that it is necessary for his subordinates to respect him "not only as a lieutenant or a captain, but as a man knowledgeable of his job, as an intelligent man, and as a political leader. In other words, he must earn authority for himself and earn it most of all through his knowledge and experience."

Unfortunately, some leaders at the regimental level, and of higher ranks, do not always remember this, do not completely fulfill their duties, and forget the immutable truth, which states: More is asked of him who has greater authority, and to whom more has been given. What does such "forgetfulness" result in? Recently, a frank discussion was held on this matter at a military soviet session. We analyzed why in combat and political training in a number of units are impulsiveness, fits and starts, and continuous interruptions observed, from which instances of unconscious fulfillment of their functional obligations by some officials still remain. For this we looked more attentively at the style of work of those communist leaders who referred especially willingly to "objective" causes, which supposedly interfered with their ability to develop their organizational capabilities to the utmost. And this is what was found out.

To this day we have leaders, they are few in number but they do exist, who were assigned to their position because someone above took a fancy to them. Not to their party and professional qualities, but to their enterprise, flattery, and ability to please other senior officers. They are able to speak using the correct and eloquent words, and prefer to work without inspiration, concerned more about their personal welfare than about improving the training of their personnel and raising the level of combat readiness.

For example, Maj A. Shokurov was named a unit commander. But, he began his service not with concern about the quality of combat training, but by using soldiers to build him a personal garage. He displayed uncommon ability in making a "warm" place for his wife. He exerted considerable efforts to see that she received money without appearing at work. His contribution to the work of the collective and to combat training amounted to giving reprimands, and he took the path of covering up violations of military discipline. The end result was that the officer was removed from his position and brought to strict party accountability. Appropriate demands were also made on other leaders who had been promoted to higher positions according to this same "principle;" toward colonels M. Yepifantsev and I. Zayenchkovskiy, and lieutenant colonels Ye. Borisov, L. Zharikov, I. Zhila and S. Ivanov. And this is entirely legitimate. The times require that the responsibility of each be heightened, that demandingness toward oneself and others be raised, and that we struggle, not in words but in action, for high end results in combat training.

That is why today a most important task of the day is the selection, placement and education of cadres, for whom combat training would become a truly most important matter. We began this work with ourselves, the district apparatus. We are resolutely ridding ourselves of those who are not coping with their assigned duties and disgrace the high title of communist. We have set up systematic training for the officers and generals in the headquarters and directorates, and are propagandizing leading forms and methods, and experience of work in the troop units. We are insistently introducing into practice thorough preparation by each group of officers from the staff and political directorate for trips to large units and units. Without this marked acceleration in combat training cannot be achieved. We are raising demands on the weight of their personal contribution to the organization of work and rendering of assistance on the ground. Importantly, this work is reliably combined with intensification of party demandingness toward communist leaders. The political department of the headquarters and the directorates, and the party organizations of departments and services have begun to evaluate in a more principled way shortcomings in the activity of party members, regardless of what post they occupy. The time is in the past when there were areas closed for criticism in party organizations, and individuals who consider that others had no right to criticize them. Thus, Maj Gen L. Nikitin committed serious mistakes in his work. The military soviet learned about his true attitude toward his work, and found a replacement for him. I think that such strict, but necessary measures will improve the environment in the collective that this communist until recently headed.

We will continue this policy of intensifying demandingness. At a seminar of secretaries of primary party organizations of the district headquarters and directorates held recently attention was again paid to the fact that it is necessary to explain fully the essence of the restructuring that is taking place, and make a decisive turn toward an uncompromising struggle to improve the quality of training and education. The demands of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, to overcome decisively stagnant phenomena in combat training, and to teach the troops that which is necessary in war, must be strictly fulfilled. It was noted that the primary party organizations of the district headquarters and directorates, and of large units and units, are called upon to intensify party demandingness toward those who train and educate people, for their real work and its results.

This atmosphere of openness and glasnost is a necessary condition for moving ahead. It was stated at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum that in the new environment the mobilizing role of the party and all communists must be manifested with particular force. Practice shows that the success of our plans depends significantly on how the primary organizations function, how they evaluate the work of communist leaders, and



how sharply they react to shortcomings. For them it is important, educating command cadres in the spirit of party-mindedness, and high demandingness toward themselves and their subordinates, to remember constantly that the authority and effectiveness of a commander's word increase greatly if they are buttressed by personal example, irreproachable performance, self-control and tact, and if demandingness is combined with concern about people and respect for their worth.

There are many party organizations in the district whose style of work is distinguished by principle, the ability to guide work to high end results in combat training, a strict assessment of instances of stagnation and inertia, and the search for unused reserves. Take just the unit in which Officer V. Barynkin is serving. At one time it was a lagging unit. Naturally, the district's leadership could not reconcile itself to this. A composite group, consisting of personnel of the district headquarters and political directorate, was sent to the unit. They studied the state of affairs in the collective, and found out how well the commanders, political workers and party activists were able to organize matters, rely on people and take their experience into account. Serious shortcomings were uncovered. The command and headquarters were unable to organize a precise training and educational process, and paid little attention to commander's training of officers. Due to this, many platoon, company and battalion commanders lacked necessary professional ability, and firm methodological knowledge and skills. Unfortunately, the party organization overlooked all this. Therefore, taking measures to bring order in the collective, the officers from the district headquarters and political directorate could not leave aside the question of the role and place of the communists in the struggle for intensification of training. It was recommended to the party committee and party bureaus of the subunits that they, in particular, become more actively involved in the sphere of combat training and practice more extensively assigning communists to give individual training to servicemen of various categories who had poor mastery of the training program. The attention of the party and political apparatus was also paid to the need to increase the demands upon those party and komsomol activists who had a gap between their words and deeds. All of this made it possible to raise the responsibility of the members of the party committee and the komsomol committee. They began to react more effectively to instances of divergence of people from classes, and an over-simplified approach to their organization and penalized those who did not like to work hard and let the training and education process virtually take care of itself. At present the situation here has noticeably improved. The style of the activity of command and political personnel has become more specific and purposeful, and there has been a more practical thrust toward results and greater attention to people.

Nevertheless, the level of party work directed at intensification of combat training still cannot satisfy us. Under the new conditions it is impossible to influence combat

training and ensure its increased effectiveness using the old methods. The demands upon the skill of the personnel and the ability of commanders to direct the subunits, units and large units entrusted to them are growing steadily. And if we are talking about large-scale results, and I think we must talk about precisely this, it is still too early to talk about a fundamental turning point in the activity of some communist leaders and party activists.

Platoon, company and battery commanders require special attention and support from senior commanders and staff officers. Located right on the front lines, where every day the tasks of improving the quality and effectiveness of combat and political training, the cohesiveness of military collectives and strengthening of discipline are decided, they often do not have sufficient knowledge and experience for this. Therefore, they cannot set up weapons firing, technical and tactical training, and rely on communists and komsomol members. And the quality of the training process depends largely on how leaders at these levels organize the training and education of their subordinates. For this reason, patient work with young officers, business-like assistance to them by senior commanders, staffs, political workers, and party committees and bureaus in acquiring pedagogical and methodological skills and mastering the art of an individual approach to people are so necessary today. But, in many collectives such assistance has not been set up.

Recently examinations of weapons firing training took place in one of the regiments of the district. What did they show? They showed that some company and platoon commanders have a low level of training, do not know thoroughly the equipment that is in the inventory of their subunits, and fire and drive combat vehicles poorly. The unsatisfactory marks received by Capt A. Akopyan, senior lieutenants V. Danilchenko and I. Shevchuk, and lieutenants I. Korolev and S. Belovol in accomplishing test firing exercises disclosed the "Achilles heel" of this military collective—poor weapons training of officers. The question unavoidably arises: Can the regiment leaders not have known that this was the case? As it turned out they did know, and the commander and staff officers exerted efforts to correct the situation. But they were able to achieve little. One of the main reasons was that, in placing reliance on the quality and diversity of short tactical exercises and group exercises, and attempting especially to sharpen the tactical thinking of the officers, they forgot about their weapons firing and technical skill. Unfortunately, the party organizations here also did not speak out. Moreover, as it turned out, they in general were little involved in the sphere of commander's training, and did not try, using the forms and methods inherent in party work, to influence the attitude of the officers toward it. As a result, an atmosphere of lack of principles and reduced demandingness developed in the collective, in which those who did not like to strive and work to their full capacities felt themselves at liberty.

That is what the position of non-interference in the sphere of commander's training that some political organs and party organizations take, can and, apparently, does lead to. But this is only one aspect of the problem. The other is this. At times we speak a lot about the pluses and minuses of commander's training, and about how some officer or another is improving his professional skill. And basically we have in mind operational-tactical, firing and methodological training. But is not the ability to work with people a professional trait? It is. This means that a most important task of communist leaders is to teach subordinate officers the ability to make contact with people, and to influence their consciousness and feelings. The political organs also have a large area of activity here. In particular, the need for more extensive utilization of the experience of party committees and party bureaus of subunits and units fulfilling their international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is thrust upon one. There vivid models exist of active and fruitful activity by commanders and party activists to inculcate in the soldiers high responsibility for improving their combat skill.

That is the case, for example, in the regiment that Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Col V. Neverov commanded until recently. Traditionally, serious attention is paid here to commander's training and to improving the level of field training of the men. Maximum use is made of the opportunities afforded by the specific conditions of service as an element of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan], for training the soldiers to operate their equipment and weapons with confidence. But this is not all. The officers are taught the need to work painstakingly and persistently with their subordinates, become involved in their needs and requests, and ably develop in them ideological staunchness, courage, and the ability to withstand great physical and psychological burdens. It is no accident that the regiment has a strong and cohesive collective, and that each soldier is a model of fulfillment of his military duty. The high moral qualities of the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers were repeatedly tested by the strictest measure—the measure of combat. And they withstood this test with honor.

We also use this experience in teaching the commanders and political workers of our district. Only, unfortunately, many of them do not arm themselves with it. Therefore, the district military soviet, headquarters and political directorate still must make their influence felt. On the whole, today we are taking purposeful steps to improve the organization and raise the quality of training of command and political cadres. We have begun to hold classes, seminars and training and methodological meetings regularly with the leaders of large units and units, based on military collectives that have achieved high results in combat training. Methodological aids, summaries and materials about positive experience in the work of commanders, political workers and party organizations to intensify the training and education process are sent to the forces. The accent in this in the work of the

district apparatus is placed on assisting the officers, especially those who are lagging or who lack the necessary experience. Warrant officers are also included in the active work of improving the quality of combat training. We pay particular attention to their education, especially that of company and battery first sergeants. We encourage the conscientious work of the best of them, and bring their leading experience to all personnel. This year the district military soviet held a meeting with the ranking non-commissioned officers of subunits, at which many topical questions associated with improving their official and socio-political activity, and increasing their attention toward improving the process of training and education of the soldiers were examined.

Only here is what cannot help but trouble one. We will hardly achieve a situation in which, let us say, a ranking subunit NCO will be what he should be, if we continue to look at him as an administrator, and not as a man who both can and must train and educate. And there is no reason to hide the fact that many communist leaders take precisely these positions. From this, when candidates are selected for the position of ranking NCO [non-commissioned officer], often no attention is paid to their intellectual level and moral and professional qualities. I have not yet spoken about training warrant officers the difficult art of leading people. There are often few who engage in this. Today we are struggling resolutely against this distortion in assessing the role of warrant officers in the training and education of the soldiers.

And what importance a personal example of communists has in the struggle for quality of the training process. No matter where the communist is, at lessons in class, at a tactical exercise, standing watch, everywhere people look at him and compare themselves to his deeds and actions. That is why the district command and political directorate cannot help but be disturbed by the fact that among CPSU members are those who lag behind, and those who are not striving to improve their level of training. And what is especially alarming, some political organs and party organizations are reconciled to the fact that some officer-communist considers his low level of professional training to be in the order of things. The party teaches that one cannot be a principled man, without being honorable, conscientious, honest and demanding toward oneself.

Concern about the high quality of the training process has always been a matter of special importance for command cadres and all army communists. Now we are seeking to ensure that the living position of all military personnel, from soldier to general, is defined by the conviction: combat training must be combat training, and not its imitation, by means of a chain of little interconnected exercises, the effectiveness of which, moreover, often leaves something to be desired. This is our duty, and there must be no compromises here.

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**Procurator Reviews MSU Vasilevskiy Book on Discipline**

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[Review by Lt Gen Justice B. Popov, chief military procurator, of Book "O distsipline i voinskoy vospitatel'noy. Sbornik statey" [On Discipline and Military Education. Collection of Articles], by A. M. Vasilevskiy, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, 30,000 copies, 401 pages]

[Text] Voenizdat has published a book by that famous soviet military leader, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, MSU A. M. Vasilevskiy. It included previously published articles, "The Primary Military Collective as an Object of Research and Social Control," "Sources of Heroism are Found in Love Toward the Homeland," "The Laws of the Soviet Fatherland are Sacred," "An Officer's Culture," and "The Establishment of Young Officers." The collection also includes excerpts from A. M. Vasilevskiy's book, "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Life's Work], which set forth the thinking and observations of the author on the role of the commander and of party-political work in ensuring military order, and his previously unpublished notes from various years on law, discipline and military education. And, although 10 years have already passed since this famous military leader passed away, his works that comprise the collection help explain more thoroughly the problems that must be solved in the interest of further strengthening discipline and regulatory order in each military unit and on every ship.

The first group of problems concern, in the words of A. M. Vasilevskiy, such an elementary truth that it would not even be necessary to recall them, were there not instances of underestimation of the role of law and order in ensuring the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the forces, and had cases of a disrespectful attitude toward law, and even its direct violation, been completely eliminated.

These phenomena even today, unfortunately, are rather widespread among military personnel, including among a certain group of commanders and supervisors. In my view, they are rooted in serious shortcomings that exist in the training of military cadres with respect to world outlook.

It is known that the study of Marxism-Leninism on the state and law is a most important part of Marxist-Leninist study on the proletarian revolution and the building of socialism. V. I. Lenin ascribed tremendous importance to arming the party and proletariat as a whole with knowledge of this teaching. Now, in the year of the 70th anniversary of Great October, it is appropriate to recall that in summer 1917, occupied with the titanic work of preparing the proletarian revolution in Russia, V. I. Lenin considered it necessary to write his brilliant work, "Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya" [The State

and Revolution], in which he convincingly demonstrated the danger of right opportunism in questions of the state and law, and especially of anarchism, which opposed any proletarian state and legal institutions. Even following the victory of Great October V. I. Lenin repeatedly criticized those who ignored or underestimated the law as an effective weapon in consolidating soviet power, and in the struggle for the ideals of socialism. In laws that expressed the hopes and aspirations of the working masses V. I. Lenin saw milestones on the path to a new life. According to Lenin, law is a political measure, it is politics.

Unfortunately, many officers at times forget about these postulates of Marxism-Leninism. This is frequently a source of a trivial, and to be precise and call things by their names, an anarchic attitude toward the law, and from this also toward military law and order. The struggle against instances of underestimating the importance of laws in military organizational development, misunderstanding their tremendous role in ensuring high combat readiness, and a disrespectful attitude toward the law must be waged especially through forming in officer cadres a scientific world outlook, which includes as a most important integral part a system of scientific knowledge on the state and law. But, results in this critically urgent matter can be achieved by restructuring the program of training officer cadres in social disciplines in our military educational institutions, as well as the program of commander's training and, finally, the program of Marxist-Leninist training of military cadres.

The second group of problems are those of ensuring the optimal functioning of primary military collectives. They are examined in a rather detailed manner in the book. The author insistently advises each supervisor, no matter what position he occupies, to concern himself first of all about the cohesiveness of the primary military collectives. For it is they, the primary military collectives, wrote A. M. Vasilevskiy, that essentially solve the tasks that face the armed forces as a whole.

The affirmation of legality in relations among its members is a necessary condition for the optimal functioning of each military collective. At present the task of forming such relationships has become especially acute, since decisive elimination of violations of law that still exist in military collectives in the relationships among service personnel has become an urgent necessity. Most often, without any justification for doing so, these violations of law are camouflaged as so-called "non-regulation" relationships. But, as checks by procurators and statistical materials of the organs of military justice show, behind this formulation are found instances of violation of the rights of military personnel, and abasement of their honor and worth.

It is therefore necessary to reject decisively the term "non-regulation relationships among military personnel," and give a legally correct assessment of the relevant



facts. If signs of a crime are present it is necessary to institute criminal proceedings as the law requires. Otherwise it is impossible to maintain lawful relations among military personnel in the primary military collectives, and ensure their optimal functioning.

A still more productive path in solving this problem is through the firm observance of law in relationships among military personnel. The lawfulness of relations in the army, the author states, is a necessary condition of the moral education of both supervisors and subordinates, for under this condition the subordinate is assured in practice that the law that obligates him at the same time ensures him against unlawful infringement. A. M. Vasilevskiy's book also has this judgement: "Lawful relations are a system under which arbitrariness, both on the part of the senior, and on the part of the junior is identically a crime." The author cites the words of one of the consistent defenders of the traditions of Suvorov in the Russian Army, M. I. Dragomirov, on the need for a tactful and considerate attitude toward soldiers, especially young soldiers: "Have a bit more heart, gentlemen, in your relationships, especially toward the young soldier, if you also want him to open his heart to you."

It can be said without exaggeration that the thoughts and observations set forth in the collection, which disclose the conditions for the optimal functioning of primary military collectives, and show the ways of strengthening the lawfulness of relationships within them, will be of undoubted benefit to commanders and supervisors in educational work.

The third group of problems examined in the book concerns coercive measures in the battle for firm military discipline and law and order in the troop units. As related sociological study shows, a rather substantial portion of commanders and supervisors believes that under modern conditions it is necessary to punish more harshly for any infringement, and that only in this way can discipline and military order be strengthened. Moreover, among those who adhere to views of this sort, there are those who see harsher punishments as virtually the essence of restructuring in the area of strengthening military discipline and regulatory order.

A. M. Vasilevskiy decisively opposed such views, and even more so the disciplinary practice based on them. He wrote that in the Soviet Armed Forces, as an army of a new type, coercion has not the main, but a secondary role in maintaining military discipline and regulatory order.

On many pages of the book the author gives advice on how to work with subordinates, in order to maintain firm regulatory order, high responsiveness and discipline on every ship and in every unit. I would like to hope that this advice will help overcome the erroneous opinion that is prevalent among a part of the officer corps about the more significant place of coercion in maintaining discipline and strengthening military law and order.

A special place in the theoretical legacy of A. M. Vasilevskiy is occupied by the problems of training and educating military cadres and affirming Lenin's style of work in their activity. To one degree or another they are examined in almost every work in the book.

The author, citing specific examples, shows convincingly that the commander has the decisive role in maintaining firm military discipline, and that it depends on his ability to work with his subordinates, display concern for them, take timely measures to protect their rights and legitimate interests, penalize those who are at fault, and always be fair. Characteristic of the author is his close attention to the works of progressive military theoreticians of the past, and prominent Russian and Soviet military leaders, and to disclosing the officer as an educator. When one reads the works of A. M. Vasilevskiy one is again convinced how important it is for all our military cadres to know thoroughly everything of value that exists in the experience accumulated by many generations of commanders and supervisors in troop command and control and maintaining firm discipline and military order.

In the opinion of A. M. Vasilevskiy, a necessary quality of a good commander is his ability to lead his subordinates, to educate and train them, maintain a high state of discipline, and achieve conscious obedience. A. M. Vasilevskiy made this view on the main assignment of a commander his credo back in the Russian pre-revolutionary army, as a result, he wrote, of serious study of the works of A. V. Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, D. A. Milyutin, M. D. Skobelev and M. I. Dragomirov. Here are some of the views of M. I. Dragomirov, taken by A. M. Vasilevskiy as principles of work with subordinates: "Associate closely with your subordinates," "place service above personal matters," "deserve the trust of the soldiers." In this list is also the advice of M. I. Dragomirov that trust can be acquired "by character, knowledge of one's work, concern about the soldier and, finally, fairness in every way, including in comparability of punishments."

Needless to say, it was not easy to follow such advice in the Russian pre-revolutionary army. But young officer A. M. Vasilevskiy succeeded. In 1916 he arrived at the front, and not long before the start of the famous Brusilov Breakthrough was named commander of 1st Company, which soon became one of the best in the regiment in training, discipline and combat effectiveness. It seems to me, A. M. Vasilevskiy wrote in this regard, that the success was due to the trust "that the soldiers gave to me." A little more time passes, and in December 1917 his co-workers elect him their commander at a general meeting of the 409th Regiment.

It is also noteworthy that, having become a Red Army commander, A. M. Vasilevskiy continued to study the works of the military theoreticians of the past. His notes about what he read, published in the book, are of

particular interest in connection with this. They show clearly the persistence with which A. M. Vasilevskiy sought in the experience of many centuries the kernels of knowledge and observations about discipline and military education that had not lost their scientific and practical value.

Here are but a few of them. "A powerful means, which inspires men to endure deprivations without complaining, is the example of their supervisors, who in difficult times share with the soldiers the last piece of sugar, or the last bundle of straw." "Many generals think that everything has been done when they have issued an order; and they order a great deal, for they see many abuses. This is a false principle... It is necessary to issue few orders, but with great attention see that they are fulfilled, and to punish without making distinction for rank or birth, and not entering into any considerations."

Examining the problems of training and education of officer personnel, the author paid much attention to the training and education of cadets and students in military educational institutions. But, nevertheless, military practice, A. M. Vasilevskiy stated, is decisive in forming commanders' qualities. "Like a director," he wrote, "whose talent flourishes not in the conservatory, but in the concert hall before the public, the commander's art of leading the military collective can be fully displayed only in dealings with people, daily military labor, and control of the battle." Developing this thought, A. M. Vasilevskiy warns young officers about the difficulties with which they may be confronted initially. The author gives them valuable advice and expresses recommendations to senior supervisors on how to aid the establishment of young officers, and facilitate their ideological-moral and professional growth.

These are some of the thoughts that I wished to share after reading the collection of articles by A. M. Vasilevskiy. I believe that it will provide rich material to our military cadres for their reflections about the problems of further strengthening military law and order, and restructuring it in accordance with present requirements.

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9069

**Practice of Assigning Troops Outside of Specialties**  
*18010341a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
27 Apr 88 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Volbrom of Yerevan: "A Soldier Off the TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment)]

[Text] I do not know whether it is permitted or not to keep a soldier off the TOE, but, in being involved with the registering of persons liable for military service, such an entry is encountered on the military cards. It might be alright if the question were limited to a notation. But it turns out that most often such persons off the TOE in fact do not gain a military specialty during their service. Some only hold a weapon in their hands during the taking of the military oath. The question arises: Why do we send an inductee to a unit where the TOE is already full?

The answer turns out to be simple, when you begin to understand what specific service duties (and not by the records but in fact) are performed by such soldiers and NCOs during service. For example, what specialty was earned by Jr Sgt Kh. Khachikyan who served in the Volga Military District? On the service file it states that he was a senior gunner, on the military card it stated a driver and a gunner, but in fact, Kachikyan asserts, he was a cook. Or take Pvt G. Zmiryan. In the DOSAAF system he was trained as a driver. According to the records in the documents he spent his service in the position of a gunner. But in fact, Pvt (Res) Amiryan reports, he was...a longshoreman.

Pvt G. Ziroyan served in one of the garrisons of the Transcaucasian Military District. The documents state that he held the position of a telephone operator. In actuality, he was the "chief of the recreation zone." It would seem that Pvt A. Zakaryan returned home after serving in the Far East had mastered a mass of military construction specialties. He was both a carpenter, a concrete worker, a plasterer and even the deputy commander of a platoon. However, Zakaryan has never held a plane or a trowel in his hands because in actuality he was the "chief of the bathhouse" in the unit.

I will not speak of the wastefulness or that such readings show flagrant violations as this is obvious. I would say something else, something directly related to me as a worker of the military commissariat. In padding the records, what are we hoping for, comrade commanders? In what military registration specialty can we employ all these "chiefs," "heads" and other persons off the TOE if all of a sudden the need should arise to put them back into army service?

10272

**Review: Ananyev—Tank Armies in Offensive**  
18010317 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Mar 88 p 2

[Review by Marshal of Tank Forces O. Losik of book "Tankovyye armii v nastuplenii" [Tank Armies in Offensive] (on the experience of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945) by I.M. Ananyev, Voenizdat, 1988, 456 pages]

[Text] One of the reliable ways to get to know in greater depth the new problems in military affairs and to carry out the instruction and training of personnel successfully under present-day conditions is the careful study by military personnel of the 70th anniversary of the historic path of the Soviet Armed Forces and above all of the extremely rich experience of the Great Patriotic War. In this connection, I think, the book of I.M. Ananyev, "Tankovyye armii v nastuplenii," published this year in Voenizdat arouses the unquestionable interest of commanders, officers of staffs and directorates, and the broad group of military readers. Its author, a reserve officer and one of the researchers in the area of the history of Soviet military science, uses documents and other factual material to disclose the varied experience in the combat actions of tank armies on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

The author's successful composition of the book, revealing itself through the analysis and comparison of the theoretical military views of Soviet and bourgeois military science in the utilization of tanks in combat allows one to see the continuity of the past and present and to understand correctly the evolution of theories and practical actions in the use of tank formations.

The establishment of tank armies in the Soviet Army in 1942 stemmed from the logic of the development of the armed fight and from the requirement to increase the firepower, striking force, mobility and maneuverability of tank formations in carrying out deep offensive operations with decisive objectives. Being from the moment of their appearance until the end of the war a system of Supreme Command Headquarters, the tank armies operated in the most important strategic directions, inflicting massed strikes, separating the enemy's main forces, and rapidly shifting its actions to the operational depth.

The book gives for the first time a detailed analysis of the scope of the operations of tank armies and of the influence of their combat actions on the effectiveness of frontal and strategic offensive operations. The author points out that "at the fronts with tank armies, the depth of offensive operations was, as a rule, two to two and a half times greater and the speed of their execution was two to two and a half times faster than at fronts without tank armies."

The multifaceted experience in the preparation of offensive operations during the war years has been investigated and generalized on the basis of archive documents.

In this connection, it is important that the book traces the dependence of the methods of the work of the commanders and staffs of tank armies upon the time spent in the direct preparation of operations. It uses specific historical examples to analyze the process of decision making by the commander, the planning of the introduction of tank armies into combat (breakthrough), the system for getting missions to subordinates, the forms and means of organizing different types of combat actions, and other aspects of preparatory work that are still of great importance today.

The author's method of a systematic illumination of the combat actions of tank armies in accordance with the stages of the operation helps the reader to grasp complex academic and historical material. And at the same time, it makes it possible to delve into the details of the questions under study. Many pages of the book are also dedicated to the actions of tankmen under special conditions and it rather fully reveals the experience of the day and night combat actions of advance corps and army detachments.

In reading the chapters of reserved historical military prose and in contemplating the scientific facts presented in the book and the description of the events of different scope, you can imagine the enormous work of our party, government and Soviet people that in a short time converted the tank forces into a powerful strike and maneuvering force of our army. In examining particularly military problems, the book also speaks of this. By and large, it speaks ponderably and is up to date.

At the same time, unfortunately, not all the pages of the book are of equal value. It may be that the author lacked the so-called publicistic spark. And perhaps he consciously limited his task merely to the scientific presentation of the essence of the question. It seemed to me, for example, that, with the background of the detailed study of offensive operations, the book substantially diminishes the role of tank forces as an extremely effective defensive means, with the help of which it is possible within a short time to establish a powerful deeply echeloned defense and to resist a strong enemy. There are many examples of this in the Great Patriotic War. Take, let us say, the use of the second and first tank armies to hold the defensive lines in the Olkhovatskoye and Obobanskoye directions in the course of the Battle of Kursk. Or the use of the Second Tank Army in the region of Praga (suburb of Warsaw) at the end of the Lyublin-Breskaya Operation of the First Belorussian Front. Or the defensive actions of the first and third guard and fourth tank armies of the Sandomirskiy Theater of Operations.... The inclusion of such material would strengthen the up-to-date tone of the book and would provide good help to military personnel that are now doing much to restructure their work in accordance with military doctrine.

I want to address another comment to the author in the following connection. On page 348, he points out that on the dawn of 3 June 1944 the Third Guard Tank Corps of the Fifth Guard Tank Army and the Second Guard Tank Corps burst into Minsk. The historical truth is the



following. In his book "Delo vsej zhizni" [A Lifelong Matter], Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy writes about this as follows: "Indeed, the tankmen were the first to enter the capital of Belorussia on 3 June. But they were soldiers not of the Fifth Guard Tank Army but of the Second Guard Tank Corps of A.S. Burdeynyy" (Politizdat, 1974, p 448).

In my opinion, the noted shortcomings do not diminish the importance of the published book. After having acquainted themselves with it, military readers will acquire much that can affect their service and work in a positive way.

9746

**Design Features of Western Stealth Technology**  
18010331 Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in  
Russian No 3, 1988 (Signed to press 17 Feb 88) pp 6-7,  
back cover

[Article by Col V. Platonov under the rubric "Status, Problems, Prospects": "Problems in Stealth Aircraft Development"]

[Text] Foreign specialists continue to improve technology systems and design solutions directed at reducing the visibility of an object by technical reconnaissance means. They report that these measures are employed principally in the construction of combat aircraft. However, a number of solutions are also employed in the development of cruise missiles and helicopters.

As the foreign press reports, efforts are being made in aircraft construction to reduce the radar, infrared and radio signatures of aircraft.

To decrease the probability of detection of aircraft by radar means, they are attempting to reduce the level of energy reflected by aircraft when illuminated by radar. The reflecting capability of an aircraft is quantitatively characterized by its radar cross section (EPR) [RCS]. The task is to reduce EPR as much as possible.

They find that one of the main ways of reducing an aircraft's EPR is to change the configuration first and foremost of those structural elements which behave like a kind of corner reflector when illuminated by radar. Power plant air ducts, engine mounting joints (in bombers), vertical surfaces of the airframe and suspended armaments are such elements.

They note that conventional designs of aircraft power plant air ducts, widely employed at the present time, are mostly unacceptable from the standpoint of providing a small EPR. Therefore, designers are striving to find the kind of solutions that would eliminate direct radiowave hits on the engine compressor. It is proposed, in particular, to employ air ducts that are cambered in a longitudinal direction. Maximum reduction in EPR, they believe, will be ensured by air ducts that have a zigzag shape with internal partitions located along their longitudinal axis.

They observe that structural solutions in which the air ducts are located in the lower part of the airframe are acceptable only for future aircraft that fly at subsonic speeds, but that they will not be very effective at supersonic flight speeds. Air ducts with vertical intake openings now employed on modern fighters, although effective at supersonic speeds, have a very large EPR. In this connection, a majority of the plans for a future fighter anticipate the use of air ducts of a non-traditional design that ensures efficient engine operation at supersonic speeds and that at the same time has a small EPR. They

plan to produce them in the form of a cone that is cut along the longitudinal axis. They expect that this will eliminate radar illumination hits on an engine to a significant degree.

According to estimates of foreign experts, aircraft engines nonetheless have a noticeable effect on EPR value, particularly in bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, but somewhat less when compared with air ducts. The creation of aircraft with engines blended into the wing is considered to have the most promise. In this way, sharp breaks in the aircraft profile are eliminated and, consequently, also the effective radar return.

To reduce the EPR, they are trying to eliminate, or at least to reduce to a minimum, the number of vertical elements, including control surfaces, from the airframe structure. They are achieving this owing to smooth integration of the wing with the fuselage along its entire length. However, according to estimates of foreign experts, elimination of vertical controls will lead to a sharp reduction in aircraft stability and controllability, and manual control will be virtually eliminated. They see a resolution of the problem in the employment of automated aircraft control systems. Such a system has already been checked out during tests of a rudderless design flight vehicle.

Rational placement of armaments also contributes to a reduction of aircraft EPR. They note that this problem is not as critical for bombers, in which all armaments can be located inside the fuselage, as it is for fighters and ground attack aircraft.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the current method of placing armaments on tactical aircraft—external mounting—is unacceptable for future aircraft models. They consider the placement of armaments inside the fuselage to be promising; however, this results in a loss of flexibility in equipping the aircraft with missiles of various types. As a way out, they see, in particular, the creation of a class of air-to-air missiles which will be installed in a bay in the lower part of the fuselage and which will be covered by a fairing that will be discarded immediately before missile launch. To reduce the overall dimension of the missile (and, consequently, the necessary size of the bay in the fuselage), they propose equipping it with folding wings and stabilizers which are brought into operational position after their separation from the aircraft.

Work is also being done on versions of containers of a conformal type to be placed in the fuselage, and which in their shape seem to complement the fuselage. They plan to provide the containers with small caliber improved munitions that are equipped with homing devices.

On the whole, in the opinion of development engineers, the configuration of the aircraft of the future will have a minimal lateral and frontal profile, a wing and fuselage

constituting one whole, small-dimension vertical controls (or none), engines that are blended into the wing, and internal installation of armaments (see 4th page of cover).

They see the second trend in the reduction of aircraft EPR as a decrease in the reflective capacity of the materials that make up various parts of the aircraft. They report that achievements in the sphere of materiology have made it possible to acquire a whole series of new absorbing materials. For example, the so-called matrix thermoplastics which possess great strength and increased absorptive capacity at a relatively low cost. One of these thermoplastics, which has been given the name "Carbon plus boosted carbon," is manufactured by layering carbon plates into a special matrix which is baked, and which afterwards is again coated with carbon. They state that the material that is acquired this way is strong and absorbs electromagnetic radiation well and, moreover, that it is resistant to the action of heat. They propose to use such material to coat engine outlets in particular.

They also hold promise for coating the leading and trailing edges of the wings and the fuselage of an aircraft with radar-absorbing material. They note that the absorbing action of the coating will be optimal only when the coating has an adequate thickness, and that this can be different for various elements of the aircraft structure.

They hold coatings with a "fluffy" exterior surface to be effective radar-absorbing materials. This kind of coating behaves like the wall of an echoless chamber when it is swept by radar, being coated with acute-angled pyramids made of absorbing materials, which sharply reduces the level of the reflected signal.

They believe that coating aircraft with radar conductive paint is less effective than the preceding methods. It does not absorb electromagnetic energy but disperses it over the entire aircraft structure, as if cooling the "radar hot spots." One of the existing types of this kind of coating was given the name "steel dust." It is composed of microscopic particles of iron, which increases the conductivity of the coating considerably.

They consider that the second task in importance (after radar) is to decrease the infrared (heat) signature of an aircraft. They emphasize that the importance of this task is determined by the fact that the IR sector of the spectrum of electromagnetic radiation for the time being is the only sector (except for the radio band) where a target can be reliably detected beyond line-of-sight limits. Foreign specialists distinguish three infrared signatures of aircraft components: heat radiation from the engine nozzle, the engine itself and radiation owing to heating of the aircraft structure that arises as a result of air friction at supersonic speeds.

They are trying to lessen the heat radiation of the nozzle by using a system of jettisoning exhaust gases which would cover the engine flame from a majority of aspects. They see one of the possible solutions in the employment of a flat nozzle with a regulated exhaust opening. In a non-afterburner mode of engine operation, that is, during a large part of the flight, the nozzle with such a design is open only at a small angle.

Another trend in IR signature reduction is to decrease the temperature of escape gases. For this, they propose to include brushes in the engine design, which would permit onrushing cold air to enter the engine exhaust and, mixing with the gases, thereby reduce their temperature.

As a rule, modern engines are cooled by forcing the heat they produce into the atmosphere. They consider it feasible to create closed engine-cooling circuits. They propose to equip such aircraft with devices for controlling the temperature of the air layer surrounding the aircraft, which would enable the pilot to see to the efficiency of heat suppression. They hold that one of the important methods for discharging heat from an engine is to pass the heated air through fuel in the aircraft's internal tanks.

They propose to reduce airframe heating by the application (especially on the leading edge of the wing) of special coatings which would decrease air friction on the surface of an aircraft. They report that the coating, which lowers the level of IR radiation to some degree, is already being used in the manufacture of ground attack aircraft.

The third task, which was already identified by specialists in recent years, is a reduction in an aircraft's radio signature. Foreign specialists consider this to be the most difficult task. It has two principal aspects. The first is that any electronic device to a greater or lesser degree is a source of telltale radio emissions during operation. In addition, the problem for military aircraft is further complicated by the fact that it is precisely during the most critical phases of combat mission execution that the largest number of emitting onboard devices must operate. The second aspect is that any airborne electronic device (transmitting or receiving) is supplied with an antenna which, even if it is not operating, serves as an effective reflector of radio emissions.

They say that a more radical way of resolving the problem is to replace airborne aircraft radio-emitting devices with systems that only receive signals, or with systems whose radiation is significantly more difficult to detect than radio emissions. For these reasons, they plan to replace airborne low altitude flight control radars with forward-looking IR sets and radio altimeters with laser altimeters. Instead of radar flight control systems, they propose to install passive inertial systems whose accuracy has now been increased considerably. In the future, they propose to execute the correction of inertial systems in flight with the help of satellite navigation systems. This method is proposed for fighter and ground attack



## СПОСОБЫ СНИЖЕНИЯ СИГНАТУР САМОЛЕТА




FIGURE: Methods of Reducing Aircraft Signatures

**Key:**

Paths taken by an air stream (white) and a stream of electromagnetic energy (black) in an air duct with a zigzag form (I), and in an air duct with partitions (II). Aircraft design that provides a reduction in the power of electromagnetic radiation owing to multiple re-reflections (III).

Version of aircraft design, taking "Stealth" concept into account (IV):

1. Pilot's compartment;
2. Radar;
3. Antenna of REB apparatus [EW apparatus];
4. Retractable container for forward-looking IR systems and laser locator;
5. Forward compartment of landing gear struts;
6. Screened electronic apparatus compartment;
7. Embedded ventral air intakes;

8. Zigzag-shaped air ducts coated with radar-absorbing material;
  9. Bomb racks of a revolutionary type with eight bombs or cruise missiles;
  10. Main landing gear;
  11. Additional air intakes;
  12. Engines;
  13. Additional air intakes for decreasing IR radiation;
  14. Absorbing array for reducing IR and radar signatures;
  15. Variable nozzle;
  16. Flaps;
  17. Interceptors;
  18. Wing slots acting as elevators, rudders and air brakes;
  19. Wing fuel tanks;
  20. Fuselage fuel tank;
  21. Conformal storage of cruise missiles;
  22. External radar-absorbing coating.
- Figure is part of article "Problems of 'Stealth' Aircraft Development" pp 6-7.

aircraft. They believe it advantageous for aircraft performing long flights—bomber and strategic reconnaissance aircraft—to employ a specially developed astronavigation system which will provide automatic tracking of a selected star even under cloudy conditions or in the daytime.

According to statements of foreign experts, not all airborne radio-emitting devices can be replaced by passive devices. For example, target search radars are such devices. In this instance, they propose to conduct a reevaluation of the parameter ratings of these radars. If previously designers traditionally tried—at a given mass, volume cost, and power engineering of sets under development—to achieve the greatest possible operational radar range and to ensure maximum resolution capability and resistance to jamming, then at the present time they are trying to ensure the achievement of characteristics that are sufficient for the execution of assigned tasks, but, in so doing, to reduce to a minimum the probability of enemy intercept of radar signals and the signals of other emitters.

Experts cite the suppression of the internal noises of onboard electronic devices among the problems. They believe that a reduction in the level of these noises is possible by decreasing the length of onboard electrical circuits: grouping connecting devices in one place and screening them, and also by replacing existing cables with nonradiating fiber optic cables. To reduce the reflectivity of a radar antenna, they propose, after a set is turned off, to retract it into the aircraft. In addition, they plan to place the antenna in a dome that is made of radar-absorbing material in the form of louvers which permit the passage of radar emissions when the set is operating and which close the antenna when the set is not operating. During intervals in the operation of the radar, they also propose to use an antenna aperture flap against beaming electromagnetic illumination falling on the aircraft.

On the whole, foreign military specialists believe that, although the employment of all of the enumerated measures (abroad, technological systems and design decisions directed at reducing target visibility were given the conceptual designation "Stealth") will not enable the creation of an aircraft that is absolutely "invisible" in all sections of the electromagnetic radiation spectrum, nonetheless, having a significantly smaller signature, the probability of detecting such aircraft by any technical reconnaissance system will be significantly reduced.

They note that some of the technical methods envisioned in the "Stealth" concept have become of interest to tank designers.

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13052

### Excess Rigidity Foils Development of Air Combat Training

18010330 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Korotovskiy, Military Pilot First Class, and Capt S. Frolov: "A Hobbled Initiative"]

[Text] The tactical training of the pilot, as is known, is the core of the combat effectiveness of aviation subunits. Everyone seemingly understands this verbally. At meetings and conferences I hear far and wide: a pilot should be taught that which he will require in war. But, the sad thing is that we talk a lot, but are doing far from everything possible to accomplish this. As a result, there are frequent instances when indulgences and simplifications are permitted, and when flights are carried out under easy conditions, where one cannot even talk about searching and creativity.

We have heard much about the sad lessons about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. From books we know how these lessons were taken into account later, how the tactics of aviation units and large units were changed, and how the tactical training of pilots and navigators was improved. We know that new tactical techniques were often worked out by the pilots themselves, displaying initiative and sharp-wittedness, and seeking out the most effective methods of conducting aerial battles, and making bombing and strafing strikes against ground and sea targets. We know, but we are unable to rid ourselves of commonplace methods and stereotypes. Seemingly we are not sitting on our hands, day and night the airfields know no silence. But take a close look; little benefit is being derived. You will see that here they played safe, there they made things easy, and over there they overlooked things. And as a result, we do not have the end result that we should.

Here is a characteristic example. According to the training program, the aviators of the subunit in which Capt Yu. Krylov is a military pilot second class were to work out piloting techniques and techniques for combat operations over the sea. The crews flew to another airfield. Taking into account that all of the aerial warriors were trained to conduct combat operations at maximally low altitude over land, the commanders began to plan flights over sea at that same altitude. But, Col Yu. Kolesnikov, who visited the subunit from higher headquarters, prohibited the aviators from working out this task, making reference to a provision of the guidance document.

On the one hand, Col Yu. Kolesnikov was correct. According to the documents regulating flight work, flights over sea are permitted only at low altitude. But, you see there is also no prohibition to flying under conditions of maximally low altitudes. So why not give the pilots an opportunity to test themselves in a more complex environment? All the more so, in that such conditions in combat will not be a rarity.

The officers in the subunit attempted to prove to Col Kolesnikov the need for flying at altitudes that would ensure the greatest probability of overcoming "enemy" PVO [air defense]. But, the headquarters representative did not listen to their opinion. He said that he was not authorized to give such permission. But, he could have referred the matter to senior commanders. However, Col Kolesnikov did not do this, and as a result the flight crews had to accomplish their tasks at altitudes unfavorable for overcoming air defense. And if we speak more plainly, they did not succeed in creating the necessary situations for improving their skills of combat employment. As a result, aviation fuel was burned and equipment resources used, and the necessary effect was not achieved. Moral harm was also inflicted upon those who attempted to display initiative, based on the real skill of the pilots.

Needless to say, we are not placing in doubt the documents that regulate flying work. They are, as we understand clearly, the result of many years of experience. Nevertheless, it seems to us that some of their provisions are out of date and based on training pilots under simplified conditions, and do not reflect today's demands.

Of course, it is impermissible to risk human life thoughtlessly. But, one can also not get by without intelligent, measured risk in military training work. There is no way one can get by in it without initiative, creativity and searching. Where can these qualities needed by military people be developed like on daily flights?

However, daily flights are literally standardized from takeoff to landing by documents. And therefore the slightest deviation or initiative on the part of one pilot or another is usually evaluated as nothing other than aerial hooliganism. In our view this is incorrect. Take just the takeoff. During the war years, aircraft took off from airfields located a short distance from the front line, for example, with a short climb, and only withdrawing from the basing area a certain distance did they pick up the given altitude. This was done for the objective of camouflaging the airfield and for the safety of the flight. Now you will see nothing of the sort. Takeoffs are implemented strictly according to a single method. That is, they are standardized. In a combat situation such a stereotyped approach could cost dearly.

This fact also raises a question. Numerous documents arrive in the units on flight safety, but almost nothing on the development of new tactical techniques. Why? Is this a secondary matter? Or do the senior officials assume that seeking new tactical solutions should come exclusively from below? It is doubtful that such a path is most advisable. It is, you see, necessary to analyze and generalize valuable experience, and to seek it through joint efforts. But, such coordination is also lacking.

Take the same regiment about which we have been speaking. Last year alone the pilots developed approximately 20 tactical innovations. Some techniques were borrowed in subunits equipped with other types of aircraft, and perfected taking into consideration their equipment, and others were born as a result of the creativity of the flying personnel. How, for example, can we not recall squadron commander Lt Col M. Osin, who proposed an interesting variant for conducting aerial reconnaissance as part of a group searching for ground based cruise missiles in a given area. The use of this variant had the best effect on the fulfillment of military training tasks.

Other innovations could also be named, the introduction of which expanded the tactical arsenal of the unit flying personnel. However, pilots of other regiments, unfortunately, do not know about them.

There are numerous reasons for this. It would hardly be correct to assert that here the senior commanders are the obstacle. The main reason for the slowing, in my view, is the fact that the documents regulating flying work do not provide for creative solutions. Neither time, nor the necessary resources and ammunition are allotted to their development.

This year, it is true, they attempted to "open" a window for this. But the attempts got no further. What happens is that techniques may be proposed, but as before there is no fuel and munition to test them out.

The flight personnel training plan is law. Freedom here is impermissible. Nevertheless, the plan is not dogma. In life it sometimes happens that some points of the plan, for one reason or another, are not entirely fulfilled. For example, this happened last training year in this regiment in accomplishing flights in a terrain-following mode in manual regime. Here, it would seem, it also became possible to use the fuel and resources saved for developing new tactical techniques. However, the documents do not permit this.

How can a new tactical technique be tested just the same? Here and there we test them through various devices, but much remains on paper. It should, apparently, be concluded from this that we not only do not take a responsible attitude toward proposals by thoughtful, talented people, but cut the wings of their initiative, and kill their interest in creativity.

Here is an example. Last year the VVS [Air Forces] main staff announced a competition for developing the best tactical technique for destroying small, mobile targets. Capt Yu. Krylov was involved in this. Soon he proposed an original development. It was approved in the regiment. As far as we know, it also received a high mark at the higher headquarters. Unfortunately, everything ended with this. Up to now, nothing is known about the



fate of Capt Krylov's proposal in the unit, although enough time has passed to test the novelty, and inform the people whether or not the innovation warrants attention.

Last year, to improve flying skill and raise combat readiness, the regiment decided to make each crew commander give a paper to his fellows on a particular topic associated with military training of flight personnel. The first papers, prepared by Lt Col M. Osin and others, instilled optimism. The seminars were lively and interesting. Each pilot could express his opinion, and make recommendations and suggestions.

Here the party organization could have become involved in the work, to generalize the experience of the best and tell about those whose papers were most thorough. However, neither Maj V. Lopatin, party committee secretary, nor the other party activists took an interest in this initiative. As a result, the spark of creativity began to die down, and then went out altogether.

Naturally, the regimental command is also at fault for what happened. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the party activists are doing far from everything that depends on them to develop people's initiative and creativity, although this is most of all their concern and their job. Unfortunately, Maj V. Lopatin is rarely seen at flights. He sits in his office and writes papers. Therefore, he doesn't even know the true level of training of the flight crews. And without knowing this, how can he work with people? How can he mobilize them to achieve new heights in military competition, and to develop initiative and creativity?

We say that a pilot is a heroic profession. But, under modern conditions, heroism alone is not enough to achieve victory. It is also necessary to have thorough knowledge of the equipment and weapons, and to be able to use them skillfully in a real combat environment, be prepared to display keenness and stratagem, and employ that tactical technique that would make it possible to place the enemy in a difficult position, and bend him to your will.

Under hothouse conditions this will not be achieved, since they do not enable such a situation to be created in which the pilot would have the opportunity to work, not only intensely and responsibly, but also creatively, and with a sense of his right to take a justified risk where otherwise growth of his skill and combat readiness are not possible.

### **Lt Gen Shinkarenko Proposes Reform in Air Force Flight Training**

18010320d Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn G. Shinkarenko, commander of the air-force of the Siberian Military District, under the rubric "The Problem Requires Solution": "I Don't Want to Be an Instructor"]

[Text] I met recently with the commander of a squadron whom I have known well since he was a lieutenant. He became a first-class pilot in the combat regiment, and prepares his subordinates well for their work in the air. Pleased with the successes of the squadron commander, I offered him a vacant higher post in the regimental military flight academy—such people are worth their weight in gold there. And his answer: "What should I go there for? I don't want to be an instructor there."

Really! The pilot took my suggestion of promotion as some sort of punishment. Analyzing everything, however, I came to the conclusion that the squadron commander was right, after a fashion...

The air force in our district has a certain feature: to a certain extent, they basically were and are, as we say, forgers of military personnel here. During the Great Patriotic War, the Siberians learned how to defeat the enemy here artificially in flight-training subunits, and their contribution to the Great Victory is well known. We are actively training pilots, technicians and aviation mechanics today as well. We are striving for the sake of that to provide the training establishments with well-trained instructors, flight instructors and modern facilities.

But this is not being achieved. An attitude of training aviation as somehow secondary has taken shape. Many acute problems have accumulated due to this that are serving as a serious drag on the restructuring of the air force in the district.

No, these lines are not being written for the purpose of justifying some shortcomings of ours. The training units are basically handling their important tasks. By way of example, the Barnaul Higher Military Aviation Academy for Pilots imeni Chief Mar Avn K.A. Vershinin has been in first place among such institutions of higher learning. The schools for young aviation specialists are turning out well-trained mechanics and crew members for multiseat aircraft.

But what an effort this takes sometimes! On December 11 of last year in the correspondence "A Flight Mechanic... Relates," KRSNAYA ZVEZDA justly related shortcomings in the state of training facilities at one of our training units. I would add the following fact: there are not enough bullets for the training of flight gunners in another training unit. The training base and

social and living conditions are developing extremely slowly in the air units of the district. This is undoubtedly having a negative effect on the quality of combat training.

But after all, the higher headquarters allots money in the needed quantity for the construction of the training base and the military airfield residential infrastructure. But it is not money we need, but stocks. If materials cannot be acquired, money becomes just paper... And, of course, we need labor resources, since there are few personnel in aviation units, and they cannot handle construction by themselves.

I read an article called "Promises Don't Warm You" in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on July 4 of last year. They could have been writing about us: the construction organizations of the military districts are assimilating only a small portion of the funding allocated for the aviators.

Today it is perhaps not difficult for the reader to imagine a small settlement of an air regiment in the heart of the taiga (officers, by the way, have no special privileges here) where it is not at all easy to train, learn and live.

That is from the point of view of material support for the training process. But now a little on the personnel of the "secondary aviation." Personnel end up at the training institutions, as a rule, straight from school: graduating lieutenants are assigned to their own academy as flight instructors or the commanders of training subunits. We then bring them along to higher posts. In spite of every effort, of course, these personnel are partially cut off from the life of the troops, and they do not know fully the practical needs of the combat units.

The commander of the combat squadron to whom I offered a post in the training regiment of the military academy thinks of it in roughly this way. In his own regiment he flies according to an optimal plan, and flies in an interesting fashion—under complex types of combat application—which guarantees a growth in skills. He flies using the most modern equipment and has prospects for service advancement. And suddenly—transfer to a training regiment. The aircraft there are far from new. Flights are unvaried. The workload, not to mention the responsibility for the lives of beginning pilots, is several times greater than in a combat regiment. The flight instructor has to work 6-8 hours a day in the air for each flight shift.

I cannot fail to cite a line from the letter of a flight-instructor's wife: "Our husbands are brought into the military settlement just once a month from the airfield. And I have sons... Isn't there a chance of letting the husbands off a little more often when there isn't even anyone to send the boys to the bath with? You know how we live..."

Yes, I know. I know about the communal housing and the poor organization of day-to-day life. I also know a lot more. How difficult it is for a flight instructor, say, to accept the "unpromising" equipment at the academy. We have too few personnel with academy military training in any case.

Even our educators from among the flight instructors try to "escape" to the combat regiment by fair means or foul. Or get off flight duty. Maj A. Gilman thus "came to earth." And he has a visible example: today Col Ye. Pribytkov could also in time "sour" on the training airfield. He holds a high official position in the air-traffic control system today.

But I think: has this problem really been born today, did no one really know about it before? At the same time, is it true that we really have so few highly skilled military flight instructors that are devoted to their cause and their calling? And there is room for growth here—from the commander of a flight to commander of a training regiment. Just try and go further! There is honor and respect. Who among us doesn't remember his first academy instructor for his whole life?!

All of this is so. But the times today require that unresolved issues be posed sharply, without being afraid to err somehow, without fearing to submit one's opinion to the judgment of others. I have suggestions for raising the effectiveness of combat training for aviation.

New labor incentives must be brought in to restore social equity in regard to the academy flight instructors, so that the most experienced commanders from among the troops themselves seek to instruct cadets. Say, award the best instructors a military rank a step higher than that in the official schedule. Provide material incentives depending on the intensiveness of their work in the air. And the regimental level must be given independence in resolving these issues. It is namely here that a distinctive form of economic accountability in practical aspects of training, in my opinion, will have the best results.

It is long since time for headquarters officers of any rank to understand that the air training regiment has its own specific nature compared to a combat one. Their combat unit has more equipment. Whence the "rear-area" distortion: The standard amount of ground flight-support equipment is not enough for us. There are not enough specialists, and the engineers, taking a chance, assign soldiers that are mechanics to the posts of aircraft technicians.

All right, some readers would agree, the suggestions are practical. But what is stopping the air-force commander of a district from trying them?

We are trying to resolve these issues to the extent possible. But in practice, a system itself where the district air-force headquarters is just an intermediate, or more precisely, a relay station between the air-force main

headquarters and the military training institutions of the district brings our efforts to naught. Plus, the district air-force headquarters is subordinate to the district commander on many issues...

As a result, our headquarters must answer almost 2,000 documents a year. And in order to answer them, we must assemble paperwork many times greater from subordinate units. We do it. We made a schedule just for the completion of planning paperwork and, speaking candidly, we were horrified: the paperwork "eats up" work time and is the undoing of vital affairs.

And the commander flounders in another whirlpool without seeking salvation. These are the so-called in-house construction projects. Earlier, to put it bluntly, the commanders had bet on interaction with neighboring enterprises and kolkhozes on the "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" principle, and the construction projects proceeded. Now things can end up very badly for the commander who makes use of this "channel." And an increased separation of the personnel from combat training is now beginning along with various misunderstandings, the payment of fines and penalties, phone calls and nervous breakdowns.

The lack of reality of plans handed down and the multiple subordination of the district air forces has led to the fact that the airfield so essential to the training of cadets has been under repair for several years already. Commissions have come and have had poor evaluations of this work. For whom? Of course, for the "intermediate link"—the district air-force command.

The conclusion inevitably arises: if the "intermediate link" does not have the opportunity of resolving independently urgent problems connected with improving the organization of the training process at the flight schools and raising the quality of the training of future pilots, and rather just fulfills the role of "post-office box," the time has come to improve and break up the existing system of management of the flight schools. Instead of its multi-stage nature, where the responsibility of each stage is spread thin, a strict and precise determination of who is responsible for what is needed. Directly responsible, without "relay stations." After all, it sometimes happens that I send district air-force officers to a training regiment for a planned inspection, and there are already inspectors there from the air-force main headquarters or the district political directorate. (Some of them, by the way, have only a very general knowledge of the nature of aviation.)

I know that any break cannot be a simple one. But these urgent questions must be resolved. It is time at last to cut off the paper river and to state openly and honestly what in-house means today. It is time to free up the training-regiment commanders' and staffs' time for creativity and inquiry and to give them the right to take independent

steps in providing incentives to flight-instructor personnel. The attention toward this category of military pedagogue should be most steadfast—after all, the future of aviation is in their hands.

I am not trying to offer ready answers, I am not trying to assert that I am correct in everything. There can be other opinions. But in all candor, I dream of the time when letters come to us from the commanders of combat flight squadrons: "I want to take an important combat post—teaching cadets. Please put my name onto the competitive list."

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### **Restructuring: Lieutenant Reinstated, Generals Punished After Complaint to Editors**

#### **Initial Complaint**

18010320a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt Lt P. Ishchenko of the air-defense forces under the rubric "Restructuring: An Acute Situation": "No Pardon for Principles"]

[Text] The chairman of the comrades' court of honor for junior Guards officers, Lt Col P. Bardakov, read out loud the telegram signed by Maj Gen Avn G. Sokolov: "Officer Kachanov is to be handed over to a comrades' court of honor and material is to be presented for his discharge into the reserves for dereliction of official duties and omissions in the organization of political-education work in the company."

The meeting lasted for about three hours. More than twenty people from the Guards aviation regiment and the detached airfield technical-support battalion (OBATO) spoke. But not one of them petitioned to dismiss the commander of the airfield-operations company, Sr Lt I. Kachanov, from the ranks of the armed forces. The overwhelming majority of the speakers proposed being limited to a comrades' censure, and only OBATO commander Maj A. Titorenko and his political-affairs deputy, Maj A. Gurbik, and two or three other officers from battalion headquarters insisted on the removal of Kachanov from his duties. This proposal was entered, in spite of the opinion of the majority, in the resolution of the comrades' court of honor.

The battalion commander, Maj Titorenko, sent the corresponding documents to formation headquarters. But a terrible reproach followed from there: "You were ordered to prepare materials for the discharge of Kachanov, not for his removal from his post..." And the statement was immediately altered.

"I was assigned as a technician in the regiment," said Igor Aleksandrovich Kachanov to the correspondent who arrived per his letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.



"My trip to visit the chief of the PVO Rear Services facilitated an easing of my punishment. Although I remain in the ranks of the armed forces, however, I am not satisfied with this outcome. I feel they have settled a score with me."

The position of commander of the airfield-operations company had opened up a year and a half earlier in the OBATO—the former commander was expelled from the party and discharged from the army for systematic drunkenness and the complete disintegration of operations. Sr Lt Kachanov—a TECh [technical-maintenance unit] technician in the Guards air regiment—was proposed to head up a subunit that was "renowned" for the grossest violations of military discipline. The good organizational qualities of the officer and his honesty and principled nature were thereby paid their due. Kachanov consented without being intimidated by the difficulties.

The new subunit commander spent literally day and night at the company—he had gotten quite a difficult inheritance. At times he despaired. Kachanov gradually, as they say, began to control the situation and achieved his first successes. In the six months after he took his position, the technical readiness factor of the airfield machinery reached 100 percent. The senior lieutenant's efforts did not go unnoticed, and he was in good standing at headquarters.

The attitude toward him was altered sharply after September of 1986, when he discovered that some of his subordinates were stealing property from private garages. They had taken that route, it turned out, long before the arrival of Sr Lt Kachanov in the company.

After discovering this, the senior lieutenant and the victims proposed that a court be convened. Matters did not get to court, however, because the battalion and the formation command undertook everything possible to avert a trial. Naturally, they were not worried about those who had done the theft. The simple matter of subjecting any servicemen to criminal liability would sharply worsen reporting and demonstrate weakness in educational work. "Col V. Kuzmichev stated bluntly in discussion that there should not be crimes and incidents in a year of radical reinforcement of military discipline," Sr Lt Kachanov wrote to the editors. And the price of "should not be" for superior officers, judging from everything, had no particular significance.

At first, they tried to speak with Sr Lt Kachanov, who did not want to withdraw his statement to the military procuracy, "in a friendly way." "The first ones they remove from their posts will be you and me," Maj Titorenko prevailed upon him.

When these approaches had no effect, the pressure tactics on the "obstinate" lieutenant were changed. "You have done your duty, you have reported what happened to the command, and the rest is not your

concern," deputy battalion commander Maj V. Romanov tried to convince his subordinate. But this maneuver did not persuade Kachanov to forego the honor of an officer and the conscience of a communist. Finally, the weightiest "argument" was put into play. Maj Titorenko bluntly declared to the company commander: either withdraw the statement or he would be removed from the battalion. This threat also did not work.

Far from everyone involved in this affair demonstrated such firmness, however. Say some of the victims that had made the statement to the procuracy were asked persistently: wouldn't you withdraw these statements if the accused compensates for the loss? And then the formation chief of staff met specially with all the victims. It is true that they assert today that no pressure was applied, that the chief of staff was holding practically a private discussion and advising them on how best to proceed. But military people understand perfectly well what such discussions signify and what the weight of requests and advice are when they come from a superior officer and are addressed to warrant officers and junior officers. In short, the majority of them withdrew their statements. And although some of them did not anyway, they are still waiting for a reply from the procuracy.

It is difficult to comprehend the position of the military procuracy. Take just these strange facts. The discharge of the participants in the "raids" on the garages was first delayed until February—and their terms of service expired in December of last year. And then they were all very quietly... sent home.

Difficult days began for Sr Lt Kachanov. The favorable certification that had been written in October with the conclusion that he was "suitable for the position occupied" was replaced with another that was in dark colors only. The conclusion was also different: he "is not suitable for the position occupied." In discussion, for example, Majs A. Titorenko and A. Gurbik cited several clear merits of Sr Lt Kachanov, but as for the question of whether they were reflected in the "objective" certification, they were unable to answer with anything instructive.

The cause of the aforementioned telegram with the instruction to invoke a comrades' court of honor in regard to Kachanov and to prepare the documentation for his discharge into the reserves was an instance of a violation of military discipline by Pvt Yu. Vinogradov. The company commander, of course, bears full responsibility for everything that happens in the subunit. It turned out, however, that this young soldier had been unable to bear the insults of Pvt S. Yargunin—one of those who had taken part in the thefts and who had not been subjected to liability in timely fashion according to Kachanov's statement, which ultimately untied his hands. This circumstance, however, was not taken into account in preparations for the comrades' court of honor.

The fact that no investigation was conducted before the comrades' court also testifies to the prejudice against Kachanov. The members of the comrades' court of honor did not address at all two fictitious entries in the service file—strict reprimands that had been imposed on Sr Lt Kachanov... while he was on leave.

There are two pieces of fiction in the very document that fixes the decision of the comrades' court of honor: it is signed by court member Gds Capt Gula, who, in his own words, never saw the final version of the document. That is whence the decision and conclusion regarding the moral instability of Sr Lt Kachanov was taken. No one had advanced such an accusation. This formulation appeared later, in the final editing of the materials before they were sent to formation headquarters.

A mass of violations, as we see, was committed in the affair of Sr Lt Kachanov. A visible lesson of prejudice was given not just to Sr Lt Kachanov, but to the whole officer corps of the regiment and the OBATO.

In defiance of logic, the battalion command continues to assert that Sr Lt I. Kachanov was not suitable for the position. We turn once again to the facts, however. The chief merit of Sr Lt Kachanov, as many have noted, is the placement into service of all the equipment supporting the airfield. The airfield pre-flight preparation log, earlier adorned with the reproaches of flight leaders, today impartially verifies the good work of the airfield-operations company specialists.

But having concentrated, the officer feels, on the main thing—providing the airfield with everything essential—the senior lieutenant was not able to achieve an ideally firm discipline at once in a chronically lagging subunit. He needed help, but he received practically none from his commanders and superiors. He could only strengthen it with excessive passion, irascibility and some poorly thought-out acts committed at one time under the influence of emotions. But this does not give anyone the right to redraw prejudicially all of the positive traits of a man and his contributions: the communist leader's view of people should always be objective and in principled party fashion. The more so if the discussion concerns an officer who is fighting openly and honorably with shortcomings.

**Conflict Reviewed by PVO Political Directorate**  
180103206 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Jan 88 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Andryushkov of the air-defense forces under the rubric "Returning to Earlier Features": "But Questions Remain..."]

[Text] Sr Lt I. Kachanov, commander of an airfield-operations company, appealed to the editors for help in the spring of 1987. After verification, the letter "No Pardon for Principles" by Lt Capt (today Capt 3rd Rank) P. Ishchenko was published by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on June 5 of last year.

The newspaper at the time related the conflict in the detached airfield technical-support battalion (OBATO). Recently designated commander of the company, Sr Lt Kachanov found out that some of his subordinates were engaged in the theft of property from the garages of garrison residents. And not only property, but liquor, which had of course come to be in the garages illegally as well.

The company commander submitted a report on these facts to unit commander Maj A. Titorenko, and then reported them to the military procuracy. The consequences were not long in coming: they began actively trying to "convince" him not to bring matters to trial.

The critical feature in the newspaper was received in unique fashion in the unit. Defending the honor of the uniform, the command and the political department of the formation rushed to inform the higher authorities that the newspaper feature was erroneous. Reference was made therein to the opinion of the communists of the battalion's party organization, where Kachanov was on the books.

In November of 1987 the editors received an official inquiry over the signature of Maj Gen P. Grigoryev, deputy commander of the PVO Political Directorate: "The communists of Unit X have appealed to the PVO Political Directorate with the following question. At a party meeting discussing the article of Lt Capt P. Ishchenko 'No Pardon for Principles,' the speakers declared that this feature was not of an objective nature, the author had not met with the communists and had no interest in their opinions, as a result of which the facts were presented in a one-sided fashion, and some of them were distorted.

"A letter regarding this was sent to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The unit has yet to receive any answer to it. I request that you return to this issue and inform the communists of the subunit and the PVO Political Directorate on the decisions taken."

There really was a letter to the editors around that time, signed by the secretary of the battalion party bureau at the time, Sr Lt S. Nesterovich, along with seven other communists, which gave an answer within the stipulated time period. There was a preliminary verification of the facts set forth in the letter, since it was impossible not to address the fact that it spoke not of the negative phenomena published in the feature, but rather described in detail the personal shortcomings of officer Kachanov. The authors of the letter pointed out in particular that at one of the sessions of the party bureau, "...Comrade I.A. Kachanov conducted himself in provocative and coarse fashion, and in answer to the bureau's decision declared himself removed from the party. This declaration was considered by a general party meeting of the battalion, and the decision was adopted to expel him from the

ranks of the CPSU. The party commission altered the decision of our party meeting, reprimanding him strongly with an entry into the service file."

Well, what happened did happen, Kachanov had flown into a rage in response to the unjust accusations made against him and the overt prejudice. Nothing, of course, justifies the poorly thought-out step of the young communist who ultimately received party censure. The feature had posed first and foremost the question, however, of why Kachanov came to be "very bad" in the eyes of his superiors after his principled statements, where he called things by their true names and spoke openly of the efforts to cover up instances of theft by officials.

There is not a word about this in the aforementioned letter from the communists of the subunit. It was thus necessary to ask Sr Lt Nesterovich at our meeting what concrete facts the correspondent had distorted in his feature, as the communists of the subunit had informed the PVO Political Directorate.

The officer was unable to conceal his surprise: "We never appealed to them!"

"None of our communists appealed to the political directorate," confirmed the former battalion commander, Maj Titorenko, and his deputy for political affairs, Maj A. Gurbik. "We had one complaint about the article in the subunit: why were all of the shortcomings of Kachanov not described in it?"

So that's the crux of the matter!

The following strikes you here: it looks like Kachanov's superiors themselves were confused about his personal characteristics. A party reference of 30 Dec 86 signed by Sr Lt Nesterovich said of Kachanov that he "strives doggedly to raise the combat readiness of his subunit. He constantly seeks ways of raising military discipline, but his experience in working with people is inadequate, and he commits errors in organizing the life and activity of the company.

"He sometimes displays passion and a lack of restraint. Honest and just, able to express himself candidly against shortcomings in work, including his own..."

But in just a month and a half—12 Feb 87—both Nesterovich and Maj Titorenko added a "negative" against Kachanov in a new document and came to a different conclusion: "Not suited for the position occupied." By the way, it becomes clear now that the party punishment measures noted in the reference of Kachanov do not correspond to reality. The party commission did not issue him a "strict reprimand with entry into the service record," as is asserted, but rather a "reprimand with entry into the service record." Where they got the idea in the documents that it was a strict reprimand could not be explained by Maj Gurbik, Sr Lt Nesterovich or the political department.

And what made them sharply change their conclusion in the certification? It turns out that there was a telegraphed order sent on the instructions of Maj Gen Avn Sokolov: "...Officer Kachanov is to be subjected to a comrades' court of honor for junior officers and material is to be presented for his discharge into the reserves." By this time the matter of the theft that had been uncovered by Kachanov was well concealed, and the guilty had escaped with a little fright.

"Had there been a trial and the thieves received the punishment they deserved at that time, after Kachanov's statement," party commission secretary Col G. Geyko told me, "I think there would have been no subsequent crimes. But we were confused by the amount of convictions that would have been on the unit. Although," Georgiy Aleksandrovich decisively expressed his point of view, "they would not have been reflected in the indicators, the results of the 1986 training year had already been tallied..."

That is what bothered them first and foremost. Is any comment needed here?

They didn't look long for the guilty party here. They accused Kachanov, who by this time, as they confirmed in concert everywhere, had completely neglected political-education work with the personnel. In short, they had decided to make the "fall guy" of him no matter what.

Here is an excerpt from a reply to the editors on the preceding feature of the temporary acting procurator of the district, Col Justice V. Bykov: "...Sr Lt I.A. Kachanov was sentenced in well-founded fashion by the comrades' court of honor for junior officers and has currently been transferred to another unit with a demotion."

Questions arise again at once. Can the military lawyer speak so confidently about the well-foundedness of the officer's sentence from the comrades' court of honor if the reference of Kachanov had been rewritten several times at the bidding of higher-ups, if they were confirmed not by the official that should have done so, while the materials for the investigation of the present and former misdeeds of the officer were rather prepared in a rush, formalistically, with corrections and erasures, if signatures were forged in the decision of the court of honor?

Gds Lt Col P. Bardakov, the chairman of the comrades' court of honor for junior officers, declared that he did not falsify the signature of court of honor member Gds Capt V. Gula.

"This most probably could have been done by the secretary of the court of honor, Gds Capt Fedoseyev," Bardakov feels.

Gds Capt N. Fedoseyev had already left for a different unit, and I was unable to speak with him. But it became clear that as early as July of 1987 Maj A. Beloshtenko, an



officer of the political department working in the battalion on the orders of Maj Gen A. Koltunov, had established that Fedoseyev could not have put down someone else's signature, since his own signature... had also been forged.

It turns out, however, that all of this was deemed legal by the workers of the procuracy in verifying the newspaper feature. The officials were also not interested in the fact that Maj Titorenko's favorite method of management was purely by administrative orders and decrees, at the basis of which lay one method of education—punishment. Over ten months of 1986, Sr Lt Kachanov had received 13 disciplinary actions, although when summing up the results for the year Maj Titorenko noted the personnel of the airfield-operations company for their better flight support for the regiment, as testified to by the corresponding order. How to understand this?

The words of political worker and officer V. Kuzmichev to Kachanov in being punished under criminal procedure are cited in the article "No Pardon for Principles"—that there should be no crimes and incidents during a year of radical reinforcement of military discipline.

"I did not say that to him at the time," Col Kuzmichev assured me. "And why did the correspondent use my name in the article at all?"

Let's say the officer did not say these words directly—it is very difficult to prove now. Who other than a political worker should be the first to dig in detail into a conflicting situation and assist in achieving a restoration of the truth and supporting a young commander who had openly and honestly cited instances of theft and other negative phenomena. He did not do this. And even now, in speaking of his unbiased attitude toward Kachanov, he is always striving to prove that the senior lieutenant was not an officer given to the command of people. That is possible. But in the climate that had taken shape in the OBATO, it would have been difficult for a true commander.

The following is testimony to this. Maj Titorenko has now been removed from his post with almost the very same phrases in the documents as those of Sr Lt I. Kachanov. The battalion received a poor appraisal according to the results of the last training year. The secretary of the party buro, Sr Lt Nesterovich, was re-elected, but the work of the party buro was evaluated as unsatisfactory. Over not quite four years, they have their fourth battalion commander and their third deputy commander for political affairs.

Much effort has been expended to prove how bad Kachanov was and how big his shortcomings were. All right, the officer actually did have plenty of shortcomings. But this alone in no way signifies that the facts he

uncovered do not correspond to reality. Why was no one concerned about taking measures regarding them? Why is ambition placed above principle?

The editors are waiting for the appropriate officials finally to give exhaustive and true answers to these questions.

### CINC PVO Decides Against Two Generals

18010320c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Mar 88 p 2

[Unattributed follow-up on article "But Questions Remain..." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] That was the title of an article by Col A. Andryushkov that was published on January 28 of this year.

As reported to the editors by the first deputy commander of the political directorate of the PVO, Lt Gen Avn V. Mikhaylov, the PVO Political Directorate has verified the facts concerning the removal of the former commander of the airfield-operations company, Sr Lt Kachanov.

It has been established that during the officer's execution of his official duties starting in December of 1985, there had been no preconditions for air accidents through the fault of the personnel, the airfield was maintained in constant combat readiness and the combat-readiness factor of the equipment was raised. The company commander applied much effort to create good living conditions for the soldiers and instilled order in the barracks.

At the same time, errors were committed in educating the personnel and reinforcing military discipline. Having uncovered instances of non-regulation mutual relations and the theft of property of garrison residents by subordinates, Kachanov reported on this in a timely fashion to the unit command and requested assistance and support. The OBATO command, however, did not render the proper assistance to the young company commander in his official capacity.

Moreover, unwarranted administrative action was taken against him. Over 8 months, the officer was subjected to 13 disciplinary actions, of which 4 were when he was on regular leave and was absent from the garrison.

Seeing that the OBATO command took no steps against the perpetrators, I. Kachanov appealed to the garrison procurator with a request to consider the instances of theft and non-regulation mutual relations he had uncovered. Maj Gen Avn Yu. Naumenko, who arrived at the garrison after this, approached the investigation in a superficial manner, not striving to bring to light the state of affairs extant in the OBATO and shortcomings in the work of the commanders. He accused Sr Lt Kachanov of everything and informed the formation command in an

unobjective manner, which facilitated the creation of a prejudiced attitude toward Kachanov. The officer was removed from his post at his recommendation.

The haste to accuse Sr Lt Kachanov for efforts to "wash dirty linen in public" engendered gross violations of procedure for considering a case in the comrades' court of honor for junior officers. A verification of the materials that came to the comrades' court was not carried out. Signatures were forged in the preparation of documents. References were rewritten in a worse light several times under the pressure of senior commanders. Instances of the persecution and unobjective evaluation of Kachanov's activity were officially confirmed only as a result of repeated verifications with the participation of generals and officers of higher headquarters. An order was promulgated that strictly reprimanded formation commander Maj Gen Avn G. Sokolov for omissions in work with educating and training subordinates, callousness and indifference toward them and violations of procedure for demotions. This order also reprimanded Col V. Nechiporenko and Maj V. Romanov and V. Suchkov.

OBATO commander Maj A. Titorenko and his deputy for political affairs, Maj A. Gurbik, were subjected to party disciplinary action for serious omissions in their official activity. Major Titorenko was relieved of his duties. Maj Gen Avn Yu. Naumenko had earlier been expelled from the CPSU and relieved of his duties for drunkenness and unworthy behavior.

The political directorate drew conclusions from the critical feature of the newspaper. Maj Gen P. Grigoryev was asked to report at a conference at the political directorate, and the haste that was manifested in directing the appeal to the editors in connection with the letter of the OBATO communists was pointed out. He did this at the request of the chief of the PVO Political Directorate.

The question of work with letters was considered at a military council of the PVO and an assembly of the members of the military councils and political-organization commanders. The attention of command personnel was directed toward the unacceptability of a lack of objectivity and principle in considering statements and complaints, as well as toward improving educational work with the officer corps, especially with young officers, and the necessity of assisting them in their official capacity.

A discussion was held with Sr Lt I. Kachanov at the PVO Political Directorate on 6 Feb 88 in the presence of representatives of the personnel directorate. The PVO commander in chief decided to reinstate Sr Lt I. Kachanov as a commander of an airfield-operations company with transfer to a new service station.

*From the Editors: The article "But Questions Remain..." also discussed the formalistic reply to the editors of the temporary acting military procurator of the district, Col Justice V. Bykov, to the first KRASNAYA ZVEZDA feature on this problem. We have as yet received no elaborations, however, from the procuracy on the issues raised.*

12821

#### **Problems of Equipment Maintenance in Air Defense Radar Unit**

18010334 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 March 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Col G. Lisenkov, Aviation Department Chief, ZASHCHITNIK RODINY newspaper, Odessa Military District: "Perestroyka": An Acute Situation—Slowly"]

[Text] I recall April 1986, a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the anniversary of the aviation repair enterprises where Col Yu. Molchanov is in charge. They spoke about achievements and plans for the future. Many workers and employees were presented awards. The Central Committee Presidium of aviation workers' trade unions awarded the factory an honorary certificate, naming it an enterprise with a high level of production competence. Suddenly, like a thunder clap out of a clear sky...

Auditing of the production and financial management of the enterprise, carried out with the participation of Col V. Stelmashenko, who had then just been named chief of the financial service, disclosed such a bouquet of various types of violations and abuses that a scandal broke out. The conclusions that were drawn by the inspectors can be judged, if only through documents. They stated, for example, the following.

The factory leaders, foregoing their consciences and the interests of the state, provided a "plan" not of work, but of forgeries. Thus, owing to fictitious documents about supposedly completed projects totaling a sum of 331,000 rubles, they "covered" the plan for the second half of 1986. In general, as it came to light, for the two years the aviation repairmen worked with losses, having gone in debt to the state by many tens of thousands of rubles. But even this is not yet everything. There turned out to be unregistered fixed production assets concealed from accounting (stands, equipment) valued at approximately 10 million rubles. This means that for years the established six percent of this sum were not allocated to the state budget. This amounts already to many hundreds of thousands of rubles in state funds.

The "double" bookkeeping and machinations muddled up totally the calculation of material resources, thereby opening loopholes in the state coffers. Those willing to put their hand into the coffers were also to be found. Only recently many thousands of rubles were stolen,

squandered and paid out in the form of illegal premiums. No one was bothered by the costly decorations in the offices of the factory administration; 20,000 rubles were spent on blinds alone without batting an eyelid. A radio-telephone and stereo system were installed in the official vehicle of the factory chief, for which 2,000 rubles were spent from factory funds. And this occurred in a situation in which the shops and production accommodations lacked cloak-rooms, clothes closets, and there was no shower or even simply drinking water.

Now already, A. Yatsyuk, former factory assistant chief for domestic matters, acquired materials in short supply, medical equipment, gas stoves, wallpaper, and tile, for which working capital went for payment. Then, under the guise of non-disclosable items, all of this was sold to "needy" people. He was generously paid back from the factory funds for services supposedly rendered to the aviation repair personnel by outside organizations. For example, 3,450 rubles were paid out to the industrial combines of the Odessa Railroad ORS [Department of Workers' Supply]. However, the inspectors were unable to find any documents that confirmed the accomplishment of any projects.

V. Plyatsek, chairman of the factory trade union committee, disposed of public monies no less widely and freely. On his instructions, more than half of the benefit trips to the Aviaremontnik rest center were sold to people having nothing at all to do with the factory.

Many of the enumerated instances of violations of state discipline and abuses by officials, bordering on crimes, became known back in 1986. It would seem that fundamental steps must follow to bring order, indemnify losses, punish the guilty, and improve the situation in the collective. This is all the more so in that the military district VVS [Air Forces] military soviet examined the results of the audit and issued an appropriate order to implement its conclusions. And what happened?

Col Yu. Molchanov received a warning about incomplete compliance with his official duties, was brought to party responsibility, and soon was discharged from active military service. Some of the guilty parties returned illegally appropriated money to the enterprise. D. Shor and A. Yatsyuk hastened to be discharged "according to their own desire."

However, as far as concerns the situation in the collective, they seemed to forget about this. No one at the factory discussed or brought to the attention of the collective or its social organizations the content of the audit document, or tried to disclose the causes that led to this sorry result. Moreover, some leaders tried to present the matter as though what had taken place was not legitimate payment for the improper actions, but as "bearing somebody else's headache," and almost intrigues by the financial service against the glorious labor collective. Lt Col V. Yukhachev, acting enterprise manager, even countermanned his own order published

on the conclusions of the audit. And he did this, it turned out later, on the instructions of Maj Gen Avn A. Grishin, deputy military district VVS commander, under whose direct jurisdiction the factory was, and whose signature, by the way, approved the audit document.

What a paradox, the reader will ask. Why did comrade Grishin not wish to punish those through whose fault the recently leading enterprise had lost its good name, and begun to give up its position? Was it not that he did not wish to air his dirty linen in public? You see, the distortions of data and losses, financial violations, and fraud, besides everything else, are the direct consequence, the deplorable result of his leadership, and obvious connivance with those who are ready to do anything just to please the bosses. Judge for yourselves.

In 1984, having arrived at his current duty position, A. Grishin began by building a garage for his personal automobile. For this he ordered 1 1/2 meters of the barrier wall of this same factory to be removed.

All of this did not escape the attention of the communists. For abuse of his official position in the construction of a personal garage, in that same year 1984 communist A. Grishin was given a strict reprimand. He stated in response that the lesson would do him good: "I will do everything in order to gain back my authority."

The people around him quickly learned how honest that monologue was. Until he received an apartment, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich occupied two two-room apartments, for himself and for his daughter's family. Then, having received a spacious apartment for himself and his daughter, he immediately put her in a separate, furnished residence. His subordinate, Maj M. Pichugin, deputy chairman of the VVS headquarters housing commission, helped rush through this machination. Soon afterward Maj A. Pichugin was named a department chief in the factory, and became a lieutenant colonel.

How such matters are pushed through is known. People are drawn into a vicious merry-go-round of mutual guarantees: you do for me, and I do for you. Judging by everything, the communist leader even carried out cadre policy guided by this principle. At his intercession, during 1987 Col V. Shmelkin, a listless man without initiative, appeared (I can find no other word) as the factory manager, and Lt Col V. Yukhachev, the as "reliable" deputy chief. Apparently, for his complacent disposition, Gen A. Grishin, having deceived the command, in the name of the district VVS military soviet requested to higher headquarters that V. Yukhachev be named factory chief. It did not happen.

A reliable chief bookkeeper, like the previous bookkeeper B. Shor, was also needed. The candidature of a certain P. Sarazhina appeared. Col V. Stelmashenko established without difficulty her absolute professional unsuitability and complete incompetence, and opposed the appointment.



All of these improper actions by the senior chief did not take place without leaving a trail. In 1987 the party commission at the district VVS political department gave him a strict reprimand with annotation in his service record.

For almost two years already the factory has been in a "fever," and the working morale in the collective has been falling. You see, people cannot help but see that glasnost and fairness have been flouted, and that a frank and honest discussion with them is being avoided, as a result of which their own faith in the authenticity of the principles proclaimed by restructuring is reduced. Who more than the political organs and party organization of the enterprise should decisively take up improving the

situation. However, they are slow with this in the district VVS political department, the factory communists are silent, and everything continues to go slowly. Surprisingly, the appropriate directorates of the VVS main command are taking quietly the abnormal situation that has taken shape in the factory.

Meanwhile, the immediate future of the factory, which is to transition to new management conditions, is threatened. In such an acute situation there is no place for temporizing, hesitation or any haziness of position. It must be truly a party position, and not stem from narrowly understood, bureaucratic interests.

9069

### Legal Aspects of Naval Deployment in Persian Gulf

18010329 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Mar 88 p 5

[Interview by M. Kozhevnikov with the head of the international law department of the All-Union Correspondence Legal Institute, Candidate of Legal Sciences G.M. Melkov, under the rubric "A Specialist's Opinion": "The 'Tanker War' and International Law"]

[Text] Letters are coming in to the editors of IZVESTIYA whose authors are asking for more detail on the dramatic events taking place in the Persian Gulf and, in particular, a discussion of the international legal aspects of the problem of ensuring navigational security in this part of the world.

Our correspondent met with the head of the international law department of the All-Union Correspondence Legal Institute, Candidate of Legal Sciences G.M. Melkov, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Question] A "naval presence"—this is the term used most often when the discussion concerns the situation in the Persian Gulf. What is the sense of it from the viewpoint of international law?

[Answer] In its most general form, a "naval presence" is the constant or temporary placement of military fleets (ships) in the world's oceans beyond the territorial waters of the coastal states that fulfill certain tasks in peacetime in protecting the interests of the state whose flag they fly.

In conformity with prevailing norms of international law (Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the open sea and Article 87 of the UN Law of the Sea signed in 1982), military vessels of any state have the right to be located in any part of the world's oceans beyond the territorial waters of the coastal states. In some places, it is true, their presence is regulated by international agreements: there exist known limitations in foreign military navigation, for example, in the Black Sea.

The criterion of the legality of the naval presence of any state is only the practical activity of its military vessels.

If the activity creates no threat whatsoever to peace or the security of any state and corresponds fully to the UN Charter, then it is lawful, which in turn makes the naval presence in turn lawful and legal.

[Question] Do the naval vessels of third countries that are protecting their own flag ships from attack and accompanying them create any threat to the countries of the Persian Gulf, including Iran and Iraq?

[Answer] The answer to this question is unambiguous: no, they do not. Consequently, the naval presence of any state in the Persian Gulf associated with escorting vessels

under their own flag is lawful and legal. They should naturally be of the smallest size needed for the requirements of effective protection.

No state of the world has the right to interfere on the open sea with the legal activity of foreign military and trade vessels. These ships and vessels enjoy full immunity from the jurisdiction of any state except the flag state (Articles 8 and 9 of the 1958 Convention of the Open Sea).

In some cases that are specifically envisaged by the conventions, a ship can carry out a verification of the rights of vessels flying its flag and, if after a verification of the documents suspicion remains, carry out a further inspection on board this vessel with all possible circumstances.

[Question] How does one interpret the actions of Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf in that case? In other words, do military vessels, aircraft or helicopters of the warring parties have the right to stop, inspect, attack and destroy tankers and other vessels of third states?

[Answer] The answer to that question is tied directly to the institution of neutrality in war. In accordance with the 5th and 13th Hague Conventions of 1907 that codified the rules of neutrality for ground and naval forces, as well as the Declaration of the Right of Maritime Warfare of 1909, neutrality in war is the special legal status of a state that is not participating in it and refrains from rendering aid and assistance to either of the warring parties.

At the same time, the warring states should not attack the territory of neutral and other non-warring states, as well as their naval vessels and trading ships. The only thing permitted to a warring party by the 1909 Declaration is to stop the trading vessel of a neutral country on the open sea beyond the boundaries of territorial waters of the coastal states to check for the presence of contraband goods and cargoes on them (cargo and goods intended for the enemy) with the subsequent resolution of the question of their confiscation or the confiscation of the vessel itself. It is possible to stop them, yes, but not to attack or destroy them, the more so without warning!

Consequently, the attacks of Iranian and Iraqi military vessels and aircraft (helicopters) on the tankers and trading vessels of other states are a violation of the generally recognized principles and norms of international law in both wartime and peacetime.

[Question] The unprecedented concentration of the military vessels of various states in the Persian Gulf cannot help but evoke alarm. They are ready to use their arms to protect the ships being escorted... Even an insignificant incident could become the cause for an escalation of the conflict.

[Answer] Several dozen military vessels from the United States, England, Italy, Belgium and other countries are currently concentrated in the Persian Gulf, accomplishing the protection and escort of tankers and trade ships under the flags of their own countries. Soviet military vessels have also had to resort to convoying their own ships after the shooting up and detention of the steamship Petr Yemtsov in September of 1986.

Yes, it is true, the risk of employing arms and the subsequent escalation of the war is exceedingly great. You will agree that in a crisis, it is very difficult to envisage and divine the true intentions of approaching speeding patrol boats and aircraft.

For example, the commander of the destroyer Stoykiy related in an IZVESTIYA interview at the beginning of January that usually, upon seeing a Soviet flag, the patrol boats turn about. And if the patrol boats don't see the flag and don't turn? And what is a realistic distance at which one can see a flag and determine the national affiliation of a ship? Under the most favorable circumstances, it is just 2-3 kilometers, which is much less than the operating radius of a missile launched from an attacking patrol boat. Not to mention that disruptions are possible in the guidance circuits of the missiles, and

they can re-orient themselves to other targets. Increasing the number of warships thus leads inexorably to an increase in the probability of mistakes and unsanctioned strikes against them, which is fraught with the danger of a broad-scale conflict arising.

[Question] What is the way out of this situation?

[Answer] There is one way out—the immediate adoption of effective steps of an international legal nature with the aim of putting an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict.

In my opinion, as a first step the UN Security Council could adopt a resolution which would demand of Iran and Iraq in ultimatum form a ceasefire for an established period of time, for example, for 10 days, or at a precisely defined date, with a subsequent transition to negotiations with the participation of the UN General Secretary. The resolution could also envisage severe international sanctions against a party that refuses to cease fire.

The Iran-Iraq war should be halted as quickly as possible. This is in the interests of both the warring parties themselves and the whole world community.

12821



**Head of New Defense Ministry agency on  
Restructuring in Military Construction**

18010234a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Mar 88 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen K. Vertelov, chief of the State Board of Examiners and Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of Lenin Prize and USSR State Prize, by Capt I. Ivanyuk]

[Text] Questions from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are answered by the chief of the State Board of Examiners and Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin Prize and USSR State Prize, Col Gen K. Vertelov.

[Question] In KRASNAYA ZVEZDA mail there are many letters whose authors think that restructuring is proceeding slowly in the military construction units. The readers' concern is largely prompted by the fact that within a year military construction workers will be working under conditions of self-financing. Recently the State Board of Examiners and Inspectorate has conducted a number of large and thorough inspections of the work of military construction organizations, enterprises, and institutions. What have they shown?

[Answer] The main task set for military construction workers can be succinctly formulated as follows: to construct facilities with high quality, within the normative time periods, and without overexpenditure of any kinds of resources.

It should be said that recently capital construction agencies of the Ministry of Defense have been doing a good deal to reduce the number of projects under construction at the same time. For example, according to the title lists of the GlavKEU [Main Housing Operation Administration], for 1988 the concentration of funds on startup objects has been increased by 35 percent as compared to the preceding year. There are positive strides and tendencies in the other armed forces as well.

At the same time the work that has been started is far from complete, and the overall picture here is far from favorable. Thus in the Leningrad, Moscow, and Baltic military districts, in the Pacific Ocean and Northern fleets, and in the Moscow housing administration funds continue to be dispersed among numerous construction projects. On the whole for the Armed Forces the volume of so-called incomplete construction has not decreased and amounts to 116 percent of the normative. The plan for the startup of facilities on the list is regularly not fulfilled.

The year has just begun but already cases of revision of time periods for the release of important facilities because the earmarked volumes have not been balanced with the capabilities of the contracting organizations.

Now about the quality of construction. Not so long ago this question was discussed in the Ministry of Defense. On the plus side, the construction organizations of the Carpathian, Baltic, Odessa, and Belorussian military districts were noted. But it is still impossible to speak of having the construction projects fully meet the requirements of the plans, construction norms, and rules. Suffice it to say that various defects were discovered at every second one of the facilities that were inspected. And it is difficult to expect radical changes for the better here without changing over to the new management conditions.

[Question] One of the most important stages in this changeover is the assimilation of the collective contract. Many specialists warn that the new form of work in and of itself is not a panacea for all problems. Without sharply increasing labor productivity and extensively introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress no interest in the results will "save" us. What is your view on these problems?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, even with the collective contract it is impossible to achieve significant economic results unless we implement the entire complex of measures directed toward increasing the effectiveness of construction work. This includes the production of modern plans, the introduction of progressive technologies, further growth of industrialization, and the transformation of construction sites into assembly areas as a result of shifting the basic operations to plant conditions. One must not forget about increasing the qualifications of workers and engineers and reducing the level of manual labor either.

Recent inspections in construction administrations of the Leningrad, Belorussian, Moscow, Central Asian, and other military districts have shown that the preparation for the changeover to the new management conditions are perfunctory in nature so far. Five-year plans with a breakdown for the various years are being developed slowly. The work for introducing contractual prices is proceeding slowly. Practically everywhere they are determined from the blueprints, which radically distorts their economic essence. The construction clients have absolutely nothing to do with the development of the list prices for construction products. And it is precisely here that the key to success lies.

The districts and fleets are devoting a clearly inadequate amount of attention to the economics of managing contract construction organizations, the strengthening of their material and technical base, and improvement of social-domestic and housing conditions. Suffice it to say that one-third of them are operating at a loss. The assignments set for 1987 for profit in capital construction as a whole have not been fulfilled.

[Question] But still, what role in the restructuring of the construction complex is played by the "technical" aspect of the matter? Is everything possible being done so that

even in the stage of planning they can realize progressive, effective, and economical solutions? In this connection is it possible to speak of a unified technical policy in capital construction of the USSR Ministry of Defense?

[Answer] One must say that the existing system for the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress is not very effective: production and scientific plans are poorly connected. Still the plan for technical development stipulates that by 1990 it will be necessary to complete no less than one-third of the construction and installation work using new technical equipment and progressive designs and technologies. The level of manual labor will be about 60 percent while in the national economy even last year it did not exceed 43 percent.

Much disorder is generated in the planning stage. Frequently the planners use outdated and unsuitable technical solutions for the basic purpose of the object. Work for technical and economic evaluation of planning solutions is at a low level and there is practically no variant planning. The quality of documentation is improving slowly. For example, last year the Gosekspertiza returned every sixth plan for reworking.

There is a lot that can be said about the reserves in the work of military planners. But special attention should be given to the problem of reducing the proportion of construction and installation work in the overall cost of the objects. Head planning organizations are not doing enough to implement a unified technical policy. For example, they do not devote the proper attention to the application of progressive three-dimensional modular, modular-set, and other modern structural elements.

[Question] Almost 2 years ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published your article which contained a concrete proposal—to introduce extensively the three-dimensional modular method of construction. Soon the Ministry of Defense had adopted a comprehensive target program entitled "Blok." How do you evaluate the course of its implementation?

[Answer] The experience that already exists in the application of three-dimensional-framework modules in the construction of industrial buildings speaks for itself: time periods for construction have been cut in half and labor productivity has increased by a factor of more than 2.5. The economic effect from just one project is measured in seven figures. Three-dimensional modules have also proved themselves in military construction projects. Nonetheless, up to this point the comprehensive program "Blok" essentially remains on paper. There have been no practical actions intended for the future and the introduction of the new method has the character of a prolonged experiment.

The most significant factor today, in my opinion, is the lack of plans for buildings and structures for various purposes made of three-dimensional construction elements. Up to this point the planners have not begun to develop a unified type of three-dimensional module for general military and housing construction.

The housing problem, as we know, is especially critical for the Ministry of Defense. Solving it by traditional methods will require either a considerable increase in the capacities of the enterprises and construction organizations or a reduction of other programs. Neither one is really possible. Increasing the proportion of large-panel housing construction, in which the degree of plant readiness does not exceed 50 percent, will not release surplus working hands for the construction site. A solution can be found only in a qualitatively different level of industrialization—plant readiness of three-dimensional modules can be increased to 75-80 percent.

[Question] Recently there have been many complaints about branch science. The entire national economy apparently has this problem in common. Military construction workers who solve the most difficult, frequently unique problems do not always set the tone in the development of construction technology. Why?

[Answer] The reasons for this lie both within science itself and outside it. First, until recently scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense did not devote enough attention to this research. As a result, not only was the volume of research not great, but also the scientific-methodological level was low and there were not enough qualified specialists in this area.

Second, it is very important to formulate the scientific task correctly and promptly and to provide the proper conditions and effective control over its implementation. Alas, this has not happened. A comparison of the plans for scientific research work and the plans for standard and experimental planning and also plans for technical development of capital construction for this five-year plan show that many important problems are being developed without the proper interconnection.

And, finally, third, there is the poor introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, which was discussed above.

[Question] Not so long ago on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA there was a discussion of issues related to the introduction of computers into construction practice. It would seem to be a particular issue, but behind it lie new forms of planning and organization of labor and management of the construction complex. What can you say about this?

[Answer] The application of computer equipment in the management of capital construction of the Ministry of Defense and in planning, unfortunately, has not yet influenced the effectiveness of construction. Even

though significant financial and material resources have been allotted for the acquisition and operation of computers. A large number of specialists have also been employed.

In planning, for instance, computers are used mainly for drawing up estimates and doing individual calculation problems, and only up to 5 percent of the computer time is used for graphic work. The creation of an automated system of planning is in the embryonic state. In a word, the available means are being utilized ineffectively.

And if one considers the problem as a whole, the trouble here is the same: the lack of a unified technical policy in construction, which was discussed above.

[Question] And last. The changes that are to take place in the near future in capital construction are essentially radical. To what extent does the existing structure of military construction units correspond to this task?

[Answer] I think that the current structure basically corresponds to these tasks. Organizationally, it joins the construction workers, planners, and clients together. But the changeover to complete cost accounting and self-financing will require a search for new forms of interaction among all participants in the construction conveyor.

Experience in solving complicated engineering problems and the construction of unique objects and complexes has shown the possibility and expediency of creating planning-construction associations. In the future, when there are long-term developments and established five-year plans, it will be worth thinking about creating such formations also in capital construction of the Ministry of Defense in order to solve concrete target problems.

To put it more briefly, today as never before we need resoluteness, creative courage, and initiative both from out leaders and from the rank-and-file workers of military construction projects.

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